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The "G30S/PKI" symbol is the 
major obstacle to democracy 
On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the seizure of power by General Suharto, TA POL invited a former political 
prisoner in Indonesia to contribute a piece for publication. The following is a translation of his article. 
Here in Indonesia, people are still misled by symbols, 
primarily the G30S/A<I symbol. I) Facts about Untung 
having carried out a military operation on 30 September 
1965, about volunteers from the Pemuda Rakjat [People's 
Youth] and Gerwani[lndonesian Women's Movement] being 
given military training, are regarded as the absolute 
truth, the whole and complete truth. The reality is that 
these facts ore only part of the truth, not the whole 
truth, and there is no way for the whole truth to be 
disclosed here at home as long as people are transfixed 
by symbols that have been mystified by the military 
regime, helped along by others. 
It is a matter of life and death for the Suharto 
military regime which now rules the country to prevent 
their lies surrounding these symbols from being exposed 
for what they are. People like D.N. Ai di t (A<I Chairman), 
Njoto (A<I Deputy Chairman), Sakirman and Anwar Sanusi 
(both Central Corrmittee members) were all instantly 
silenced for no other reason than to prevent the lies 
about the G30S/A<I from being exposed. lnasfor as any A<I 
leaders were tried in the lawcourts, the primary concern 
was that the person in question would not be in a 
position to analyse the event in its entirety, would not 
be able to deal comprehensively with the circumstances 
that led to the occurrence of the G30S/PKI. The trials 
also served the purpose of giving the impression that the 
law still functions in Indonesia. 
The tragedy of the A<I's silence 
It ls indeed tragic that in all these 20 years, the PKI 
has not been able to present its own account of the 
charges made ago inst it, apart from a short statement 
circulated by Njoto at Bogor Palace in October 1965, the 
defence pleas of a few PKI leaders who were tried in 
court which were mostly defensive in nature and dealt 
with practical details, and the short statement issued by 
the Central Committee of the A<I in October 1965, the 
brief message of which was that "the G30S was an internal 
affair of the Army". To the knowledge of this writer, 
neither the A<I Central Committee nor anyone mandated to 
speak on its behalf, nor anyone who could in an emergency 
speak for it, has issued a single document capable of 
smashing the symbol of the G30S/A<I. 
How does one explain the fact that Munir was sentenced 
to death and executed whilst Rewang was not sentenced to 
I) GJOS stands for the 30 September (1965) Movement; A<I 
stands for Indonesian Communist Party. 
death and is apparently about to be released even though 
he was the principal figure in the South Blitar affair? 
This has nothing to do with questions of law. The reasons 
are purely political. Munir was regarded as being a 
potent ipl danger, someone who might have been able to 
destroy that symbol, given the time and opportunity. 
Munir had the respect of his comrades. Rewang's record 
during interrogation and during his detention was not 
considered as anything serious by the men in power. They 
saw him as a man without leadership qualities, as a 
corrmunist they had no reason to fear. Without knowing the 
reasons for such intelligence analysis, the execution of 
Munir comes as a 'complete surprise' while Rewang's 
'release' is incomprehensible. But one thing is clear: it 
all centres on the symbol of the G30S/PKI. 
It is understandable that it has been difficult for the 
A<I to expose the lies surrounding the G30S/A<I because 
of its own reluctance to publicise internal party 
affairs, to admit that the party's strategic defeat was 
the result of a poverty of theory, making it impossible 
for anyone to produce a satisfactory explanation. It may 
well be that the Untung movement would never have 
happened or would not have been the fiasco it was if the 
A<l's strategy had been correct. 
That Army generals succeeded in creating the G30S/PKI 
is not unconnected with the pre-conditions that had been 
brought about by the A<I itself. Unless people have the 
courage to be completely open about their own disorders, 
it will be difficult to destroy the lies surrounding the 
G30S/A<I symbol. Once this has been done, the next 
question people will ask is, ''How was it possible for the 
A<I with its three millions members, with more than a 
hundred of its best cadres in the Central Corrmi ttee, to 
have been so easily and rapidly wiped off the political 
map of Indonesia? How could the PKI have been swept away 
in a political and military adventure, bringing about its 
own destruction?'' If people try to expose the lies of the 
G30S/A<I syrrbol without having the courage to analyse the 
internal facts about the PKI itself, the results will be 
the same. The facts will be partial and incomplete. 
All democrats will benefit from demystification of the 
GJOS/A<I syrri>ol 
There is a desperate need to know the absolute truth 
about the GJOS/A<l both here in Indonesia and elsewhere 
in the world, because the G30S/PKI symbol has been a 
calanity not only for conmunists but for the millions of 
Indonesians who lost their lives in the wc:ke of the 
military seizu re of power . It hos also vict imised 
Mu slims, nat ionalists; in short, all Indonesian democrats 
ore threa tened by that symbol, they con all be pounced on 
by Kopkomt ib [the Army's security corrrnond] and face the 
likel ihood of being pun ished by the some lows of 
subvers ion. 
The occasion of the 20th anniversary of the GJOS/PKI is 
the refore the appropriate moment to draw attention once. 
again to some basic facts so as to refresh our memories, 
and to prove that not all of us hove been token in by the 
symbol of the GJOS/PKI. 
Deception and fabrication 
The name Lieutenant-Colonel Un tung gave to his movement 
was the 30 Septerrber Movement. It was the military junta 
that later added the stroke and the initials, 'PKI'. 
President Sukarno himself called it the 1 October 
Movement, but this was not a name to the liking of the 
military junta because the 1 October Movement was in fact 
the start of their mi Ii tary coup d'etat, and it would not 
have been appropriate to odd the initials A<I to such a 
name. For it was on 1 October that the military launched 
their military operation to seize state power from 
President Sukarno. Who con deny this? 
Even tbough 20 years hove already passed, the GJOS/A<l 
is sti 11 foisted on the corrmunity for the most absurd 
reasons. Forest fires ore blamed on GJOS/A<l remnants, or 
fires that destroy high-rise buildings, or floods. When 
workers tc:ke action or peasants defend their land against 
expropriation, the GJOS/PKI is held responsible. Even 
pickpockets and chicken-thieves ore linked to the 
GJOS/PKI. 
Someone who is only 20 years old needs a GJOS/PKI 
clearance certificate to get a job or enrol at a 
university. Even if a person was detained more than ten 
years ago, as on ex-tapol (political prisoner) he or she 
is issued with on identity cord bearing the initials ET 
for ex-tapol. By marking their cords in this way, the men 
in power restrict openings for ex-topols to get work. 
They ore forbidden from working as journalists or writers 
or teachers or preachers. People who ore running a 
business must also hove their identity cords stomped with 
the ET sign to make sure that no-one will wont to work 
for them. On the other hand, ETs still shoulder a number 
of burdens: reporting once a month, providing passport 
photos twice a year, toking port in indoctrination 
courses once a month. This not only means extra financial 
burdens, it is also the cause of a great deal of 
psychological stress. 
Not satisfied with these violations of basic human 
rights, the Suharto military regime recently executed 
Munir, Rustomo, Gotot and Djoko even though they hod 
already served sentences of 17 years. Thus, they were 
punished twice over, 17 years in prison plus the death 
sentence, which is the most inhuman thing of oil to do. 
Why does the Suharto military regime think and act in 
such on irrational way? This cannot be understood unless 
we toke account of the influence of symbols in Indonesian 
society. Just see how Indonesion'society is led astray in 
a jungle of symbols. Pancosila, the 1945 Constitution, 
Pancosilo Democracy, the Sanctity of Poncosilo, Notional 
Stability, and all the rest of it, whereas the myths 
surrounding these symbols and the reality of their 
practice are poles apart. It's the symbols that people 
ore told to believe, not the things that happen in real 
life. The G30S/PKI symbol is the holiest symbol of all 
for the Suharto military regime. Indeed, how else could 
it be for this is the symbol which gave birth to military 
power in Indonesia. This is the symbol that made Suharto 
President of Indonesia. The G30S/PKI is the bastion of 
all the other symbols. The GJOS/PKI symbol is the 
greatest achievement of the military junta under the 
leadersh i p of Suharto. 
This symbol didn't just foll out ·of the sky. It came 
about by means of treachery against the state and moss 
murder. It brought Suharto to the surrrnit of state power. 
This is why it needs to be constantly replenished, which 
includes sacrificing the lives of Munir and our other 
comrades, all for the sake of preserving the magic of the 
G30S/PKI symbol. But it's not only corrrnunist lives that 
keep it thriving; others too, including Muslims and 
po tr iot ic nationalists like Sow ito, H.R. Dhorsono and 
others must be sacrificed to preserve the fiercesome 
image of the G30S/PKI symbol. 
True, a great deal hos already been written by scholars 
in Europe, Australia and America who hove tried to mc:ke 
on honest assessment of the G30S/PKI, and hove critically 
analysed the problem, but virtually nothing is known 
about such work here in Indonesia. Language presents a 
barrier, of course, but more than this, it is hos not 
proved powerful enough to counter the systematic, oll-
embracing propaganda churned out by the goverrment, with 
the result that the G30S/PKI symbol still misleads people 
to the advantage of the military regime. 
Whose coup was it? 
The events of 1 October led to the overthrow of 
President Sukarno. But whose coup was it? On that day, 
Sukarno was with the forces of Untung, Latief and Heru at 
Halim Perdonokusumah Airbase. He was free to mcke contact 
with anyone he wonted and was provided with on escort to 
go home to his palace in Bogor. But later on, after his 
presidential powers were seized by Suharto, he was placed 
under house arrest and even rudely interrogated by 0 man 
named Durmawel. 
Who, then, overthrew· Sukarno? Who undermined his 
authority and mode it impossible for him to run 
government affairs and find a political solution, to put 
a stop to the spilling of the blood of millions of 
innocent people? Who were the assassins of the people? 
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Who carried out a coup d'etat, the G30S/A<l or the 
military junta? Who betrayed the state by making secret 
contact with Malaysia, Uitung or Ali Murtopo and Benny 
Murdani? 
The po1riotic forces of the people will not be able to 
restore democracy in Indonesia as long as the G30S/A<l 
symbol still clouds their vision, as long as we regard 
the symbols created by the regime as sacrosanct. The 
Suharto military regime can only be thrust aside if the 
democratic forces can shake off the Influence of these 
disruptive and misleading symbols. Not· yesterday, or 
today, but tomorrow for sure, just as surely as the sun 
rises in the east, truth and justice will prevail. 
Mira, 30 September, 1985, .Jd<arta 
~~~~~:~i~a!:;i~;: !~~Y~::trrso~::;~:e;a~f s~~ •;:;;e:~a;2c=:;: ·.~-E_• .... r.~,,_i_~ .  ¥_ .. .7 ·, ....... 'ef'".;>$,: .. 1965. Aidit was captured on that day by on Army unit under the conTT11Jnd of 9,,. 
Colonel Yosir Hadibroto, acting under the orders of Suharto to capture him 
and shoot him dead. His murderer's account of the capture and execution was 
reported in the Indonesian press in October 1980. (See T APOL Bulletin, No 
41 /42, Septeni>er-November, 1980 for a full translation.) 
Aidit's assassin is now governor of the province of Lompung. 
Three more long-term political prisoners executed 
Three more longterm communist political prisoners were executed at the beginning of JulfJ in Pamekasan an the island of 
Madura, north of East Java. ThelJ are Gatot Lestario (Sutarljo), Djoko Untung and Rustomo, all of whom were arrested in 
late 1968 or earlfJ 1969. All were tried more than seven 1Jears after their arrest and had spent 17 1Jears in prison blJ the 
time of their executions. 
The executions were carried out in secret. The first 
reports reached the outside world early in August. Only 
after widespread protest had been expressed, especially 
in Holland, did the authorities in Jakarta finally admit, 
on 30 August, that the executions had tcken place. 
Secrecy also surrounded the conditions under which the 
executions took place. According to independent reports, 
close relatives were given a last chance to meet the 
condemned men the night before the executions. This did 
not include the wives of Gotot Lestario and Djoko Untung, 
both of whom are themselves in prison. TAPOL understands 
that Gotot met his elderly mother but none of his 
children prior to his death. 
The three men's bodies were thrown into holes after 
execution, and were not properly buried until a month 
later. 
More executions could follow 
Confirming the executions, Justice Minister, Ismail 
Saleh claimed they had been in accord with 'due process 
of law'. 'Whoever has gone through the existing process 
of law ••• and at the end, his request for a pardon is 
turned down, must hove his sentence carried out." 
~arta Post, 31 August) This means that more executions 
could soon follow. 
According to AFP in Jakarta (28 August), another 
corrrnunist prisoner, trade unionist Ruston Widjajasostra, 
whose clemency plea hos been rejected, is soon to be 
executed, and Sukotno, former leader of the corrrnunist 
youth organisation, Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth) "who 
hos refused to ask for a pardon, could also be shot this 
year". Both men were arrested in late 1968, ofter the 
Army's crackdown on a group of corrrnunists who tried to 
re-organise themselves in South Blitar, East Java, 
together with the three men executed in July and Moharrrnad 
Munir, who was executed in May. 
The "full process of Indonesian law" 
~ndonesia's military rulers are trying to disarm 
international protest against the execution of political 
prisoners - communist as well as Muslim - by claiming 
that the victims hove enjoyed 'due process of the low'. 
The some argument is used by western goverrments as 
justification for their refusal to td<e positive action 
to halt the executions. At a time when the regime is 
going ahead with a new wove of trials, it is useful to 
excmlne procedures used for political trials. 
On 27 August, Lord Avebury, chairman of the 
Parliamentary Human Rights Group wrote to the British 
Foreign Secretory, Sir Geoffrey Howe, about "the 
clandestine execution of three more political prisoners 
in Indonesia" which he described as "an act ..• of 
extreme and quite gratuitous cruelty''. Surely, he went 
on, "there comes a point at which our concern has to be 
marked by sane practical initiative, going beyond ritual 
incantations of disapproval". 
Replying in an undated letter, Sir Geoffrey Howe argued 
that "the three men were tried and had their senten~es 
upheld according to the full process of Indonesian law". 
Such a claim reveals a gross disregard for the violations 
of established legal procedures to which all tried 
political prisoners ore subjected. In fact, the trials 
currently under way serve to renew concern over the 
travesties of justice perpetrated in the Indonesian law 
courts. 
In the following, we excrnine the trial of Gatot 
Lestario and Djoko Untung. (A third defendant, Basuki, 
died while the trial was in progress under circumstances 
that have never been revealed.) 
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Executions and "fair" trials 
Arrest and pre-trial detention 
Both men were arrested by military officers acting on 
instructions of KOPKAMTIB, the Army's unconstitutional 
Operational Commard for the Restoration of Security and 
Order, a body that is not answerable to Parliament nor tC?> 
any other legal authority. This arm of repression was 
created in October 1965, ostensibly for "a transitional 
period" to deal with "temporary disorders" but has 
remained in existence ever since. 
Their trial in Bli tar was held seven years after their 
arrest, infringing the stipulations of the criminal 
procedural code then in force imposing limits on the 
period of detention without trial. Indefinite, longterm 
detention was given spurious legitimation by KOA<AMTIB 
Decree No 5, 1969 which empowered the Attorney-General to 
hold 'suspects' indefinitely without any trial or pending 
trial. Here is an example of an illegal body giving 
unlawful powers to the regime's law-enforcement officer. 
These 'special powers' were granted for use in cases of 
'subversion', ie, for political cases. 
The charges 
Gatot and Djoko were accused of subversive activities 
prior to and after 30 September 1965, in particular of 
attempting to revive the PKI in South Blitar after it had 
been banned. These charges raise two fundamental issues, 
the illegality of the 1963 Anti-Subversion Low and the 
illegality of General Suharto's 1966 edict banning the 
Communist Party (PKI). 
Defence lawyers acting for defendants in numerous 
subversion trials since 1965 have argued that the Anti-
Subversion Law which was first enacted as a Presidential 
Decree by Sukarno in May 1963 is unconstitutional. 
Although it was introduced as an 'emergency measure' 
which suspended the basic democratic rights safeguarded 
in the Indonesian Constitution, it was formalised as a 
low in 1969 with its anti-democratic contents fully 
intact. 
Unlike other laws which require that criminal acts must 
be proven, the Anti-Subversion Law allows the maximum 
penalty of death to be passed on a person who "has 
engaged in an action with the purpose of, or clearly with 
the purpose which is known to him, or can be expected to 
be known to him" that fall under a list of vaguely-
def ined subversive acts like "deviating from the ideology 
of the l"ancasila or the State", "disseminating feelings 
of hostility... causing splits, conflict, chaos or 
disturbances among the population", and so on.1) 
Defence lawyers have appealed to judges to use their 
interpretative discretion to reject the Anti-Subv~rsion 
Law as unconstitutional, knowing full well that 1udges 
are not in a position to do so because they are in the 
employ of the Executive, bound by its policies and 
therefore not able to act as independent agents. 
Although Gatot and Djoko Untung were initia.lly ch~r~ed 
under several art ides of the Criminal Code an addition 
to the Anti-Subversion Law, these 'subsidiary charges' 
were dropped because the prosecutor argued in his 
surrming-up speech that the 'primary charges' based on the 
Anti-Subversion Law had proved sufficient to bring a 
verdict of death. 
The decree banning the PKI was issued on 12 March 1966 
as a 'presidential decree' signed by General Suharto, not 
Sukarno who was still the president. This 'presidential' 
decree was later given the status of a decree of the 
Consultative Assembly (MPRS}, a body composed of 
presidential appointees. The MPRS inherited from Sukarno 
was drastically purged of Sukarno appointees who were 
replaced with Suharto appointees. This was a case of an 
illegal decree being legitimised by an illegally-
constituted law-making Assembly. 
The judges 
Indonesian judges are appointed by the President and 
are not impartial. As civ ii servants, they must belong to 
KORPRI, the Corps of Public Servants. The decree setting 
up KORffil specifies that its guiding principles are to 
maintain political stability and reinforce the allegiance 
of its members to the State and the governTient. This fact 
alone negates the whole idea of a fair trial. ' 
The chances of judges exercising any independence in 
the cases of people on trial for 'involvement in the 30 
September 1965/PKI Movement' were particularly remote. 
There have been no known acquittals and sentences possed 
down have been extraordinarily harsh. The Suharto regime 
rests its claim to legitimacy on its insistence that the 
PKI was responsible for the 30 September Movement and 
therefore communist defendants could expect no sympathy, 
let alone impartiality from their judges. 
The Defence 
Although some of the defendants now on trial hove been 
able to obtain the services of lawyers of their own 
choice, this was not the case with Gatot and Djoko 
Untung. They tried unsuccessfully to contact three well-
known, independent lawyers, Yap Thiam Hien, Buyung 
Nosution and Aryonto. They rejected the court-appointed 
lawyers and were therefore forced to handle their own 
defence. 
1) See Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia: law, Propaganda 
and Terror, Zed Press, London, 1983, page 229-230. 
Member of the PKI Politbureou, 
Sudisman, on trial in Ja<arta in .lily 
1967. Sudismon was the only one of the 
five-man Poli tbureau who was brought to 
trial and sentenced to death before 
being executed. The other four, D.N. 
Aidit, M. Lukman, Njoto and Ir 
Sakirmon, were all shot dead 
irrwnediately after being captured. Apart 
from the story told by Yasir Hadibroto 
of Aidit's murder, there has been no 
official account of any of these 
'disappearances'. 
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Indonesian political prisoners under sentence of death 
This list includes all long-term political prisoners arrested for alleged involvement in the 1965 events who, according 
to TA POL 's records, are under sentence of death. In some cases, the most recent entries go back several years. 
It also includes Muslim prisoners arrested and tried in the past few years. (Corrections from readers would be welcome.) 
Nmne Age Arrested Sentenced Prison Position 
1. 60 1967 March 1975 Abdullah Alihamy Padang Secretary, CDB Riav 
2. Asep Svryaman 61 1971 August 1975 Cipinang PKI 'Special Bureau' and post-1965 COB, 
Central Java 
3. Azhar bin Mohanmad Safar Sept. 1982 Member 'lmran's group' (Muslim) 
4. Boiman Medan? 
5. Bono (Mvlyono or Walvyo) 59 1967 Sept. 1968 Cipinang PKI 'Special Bureau' 
6. Anatasivs Bvang 45 1965 Nov. 1969 Cipinang Army, Cakrabirawa 
7. Bvngkvs 58 1965 July 1971 Cipinang Army sergeant, Cakrabirawa 
8. Amar Hanafiah Banjarmasin Secretary, South Kalimantan CDB 
9. Hargiyono " 1965 1967 Cipinang Army corporal 
10. lskandar Svbekti 64 1968 Dec. 1972 Cipinang PKI Secreter i at 
11. lsmanto 61 1968 Dec. 1974 PKI leader, North Sumatra 
12. Kamarvzaman * 59 1967 March 1968 Cipinang? Head, PKI 'Special Bureau' 
13. Kami! 57 1965 May 1967 Nvsakembangan Army lieutenant 
14. Moman Kuswayadi April 1983 Member 'Imran's group' {Muslim) 
15. Wismar Marpaung 1977 
16. Marsvdi 57 1965? July 1976 Cipinang Air Force sergeant-major 
17. Much tar Effendi Si rat Avg. 1974 
18. Moeder isman Jan. 1973 Medan? PKI, North Sumatra 
19. Mvlyono Svryowardoyo ** 62 1965 1966 Army officer 
20. Jvsvf Rabidi * 53 1965? 1968 Nvsakembangan PKI, Solo 
21. Nvrahoyan 45 1965 1969 Cipinang Army, Cakrabirawa 
22. Raswad 60 1965 April 1968 Cipinang Army sergeant, Cakrabirawa 
23. Johan Rivai * 72 Padang Army major 
24. Rvslan Widjajasastra ** * 69 1968 July 1974 Cipinang PKI and former deputy-chairman, SOBS I 
Central Council till 1964 
25. Satar Suryonto 1965 April 1971 Cipinang Army, Cakrabirawa 
26. Bambang Si spoyo 36 May 1985 'Komondo Jihad' (Muslim) 
27. Svdiono *** 62 1966 Sept. 1973 Cipinang Air Force colonel 
28. Svgeng Sugiarto 1965 Oct. 1966 
29. Svjadi Cipinang Army, Cakrabirawa 
30. Svkardjo 1965 March 1969 Cipinang Army sergeant, Cakrabirawa 
31. Svkarman 66 May 1976 Pamekasan Member COB, East Java 
32. Svkatno **** 56 1968 March 1971 Cipinang Secretary-General, Pemvda Rakyat (People's 
Youth) 
33. Svlaiman 56 1965 Nov. 1969 Cipinang Army, Cakrabirawo 
34. Svmbodo * Feb. 1970 Pamekasan Army I ievtenant 
35. Svpono 64 1969 March 1972 Cipinang PKI 'Special Bureau' 
36. Svradi 1) 1965 Feb. 1970 Cipinang Army captain 
37. Svrmo Cipinang Army sergeant 
38. Svrono Hadiwiyono 1965 Oct. 1970 Cipinang Army, Cakrabirawa 
39. Svwandi 1968 June 1973 Pamekasan Central Conmi ttee, PKI 
40. Svyono Medan 
41. Tamvri Hidayat 1965? Sept. 1967 Den Pasor Army 
42. Abdullah Unor 2) 35. 1980 June 1985 Jogjakarta 'Komando Jihad' (Muslim) 
43. Giyadi Wignyosuharyo 58 1965 Oct. 1968 Cipinang Army sergeant, Cakrabirawa 
44. Wiroatmodjo 65 1965? Oct. 1966 Medan 
45. Amin Zein * March 1975 Padang Peasant leader and journalist 
46. Timzar Zvbil 35 1977 Morch? 1978 Medan Muslim journalist 
(sentence under review) 
1) Two Suradis (both Army captains) were listed in 1980. One named Suradi Prawirodiharjo died in Cipinang prison in 
1982. The other one, also held in Cipinong, was sentenced to life imprisonment but his sentence was raised to death 
on appeal. 
2) Abdullah Unor's death sentence was ini:>osed by the High Court on appeal by the prosecutor against a life sentence 
imposed by the District Court. The prosecution had asked the District Court for a death sentence. 
* Death sentence may hove been conmvted. 
* * May already have been executed. 
* * * Clemency plea against death sentence has been rejected. 
**** Svkatno lost his appeal at the Supreme Court and, according to AFP, has refused to ask for clemency. 
Glossary CDB = PKI provincial carmittee. 
Cakrabirawa = Palace Guards Regiment 
SOBSI = All Indonesia Trade Union Federation 
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Gotot's defence statement 
The full text of GatDt Lestaiio's defence statement is now available abroad. It is written by hand on nearly 80 pages of 
exercise-book. notepaper. The statement was made on 26 December 1975. The following are extracts from the statement which 
we publish as an imp ortant document on the extermination of the left which followed in the wak.e of Suharto's seizure of 
power twenty years ago. 
Members of the Court, Presiding Chairman and Prosecutor, 
A dozen Kali sosoks 1) will not prevent the banners ot 
Democracy, National Independence and Social Justice from 
being unfurled. 
On this day, I am going to present my defence. The case 
being tried here is a political case which has now 
entered its eleventh year, and involves events that 
happened ten years ago known as the G30S2) Affair, as 
well as events that happened seven years ago known as the 
South Blitar Affair. 
I have no illusions whatsoever about this trial. I know 
that regardless of what ·may have been raised so far in 
court, it will in the end comply with and proceed 
according to the wishes and intentions of those in power, 
the victors. This court which has been given the task of 
trying me cannot do other than take sides with and defend 
those in power. I understand this perfectly well. Yes, 
the trials of the so-called G30S cases that have been 
conducted up to now are show-trials which are designed 
for political consumption by those in power. The verdicts 
have already been fixed by the men in power. 
All my comrades have spoken in their trials about the 
sufferings of the tapols because of the inhuman way they 
are treated, the violations of human rights corrrnitted by 
the authorities. Many political prisoners were picked up 
on nothing more than guesswork and forced to say that 
they were members or sympathisers of the PKI (Partai 
Komunis Indonesia, the Indonesian Corrrnunist Party). This 
means they were arrested only because of political 
differences with the the men now in power. 
I con hardly do less than accuse the government for its 
barbarous treatment of the tapols. The men in power are 
perpetrating genocide - surreptitious, slow-but-sure mass 
murder. Whether deliberately or not, they are quietly 
acting, in violation of the UN Charter, to exterminate a 
group ot people in society whose views, beliefs and ways 
of thinking di Her frcrn those of in power. From this 
platform, I appeal to all people and organisations to do 
everything in their power to compel the Indonesian 
government to end practices that are totally at variance 
with basic human rights and with every humanitarian 
principle. 
In October and November 1965, massacres took their toll 
of hundreds of thousands of innocent lives. A state 
corrrnittee set up on the instructions of President Sukarno 
gave a figure of 300,000, while Antara news agency 
reported a figure of 500,000 in October 1966. Then in 
1969, a campaign of terror and slaughter was unleashed by 
state security forces against people in Purwodadi and 
Grobogan and yet more lives were lost. 
The law ot mdikasi has been used to arrest thousands 
upon thousands of people because of 'indications' that 
they are members of the People's Youth (PR), the 
Indonesian Peasants' Union (BTI), the League for People's 
Culture (Lekra) and other organisations; some have been 
forced to soy they were members or sympathisers of the 
PKI. In virtually every case, the arrests were made 
without a warrant and the people have been held 
indefinitely. The detainees have remained in detention 
for years on end in conditions that fail to comply with 
minimum health needs: sleeping on a single mat, crarrrned 
to overflowing into cells far in excess of capacity - a 
cell for 2? persons accorrrnodoting a hundred, ten people 
~rarrned into a one-person cell, and up to this very day, 
1n 1975, cells of two or three metres intended for one 
person being used for five. 
Gatot (right) with other prisoners in Pamekasan 
What was the GJOS? 
My comrades have told the court that the PKI did not 
wage a r.ebell ion or coup, that the dissolution of the A<I 
is illegal, and that the South Blitar Affair was an 
inevitable consequence of the fact that corrrnunists and 
other democrats were placed outside the low, becoming 
people who could be murdered at will, without sanction. 
US imperialism and the CIA mode many attempts to 
overthrow President Sukarno and destroy the PKI •.•. But 
Sukarno was too self-confident, too sure of his ability 
to unify all groups in Indonesia, and foiled to realise 
that there were many sycophants and hypocrites among his 
supporters, that the contradiction between the developing 
nations and the imperialist countries is a basic world 
contradiction which is antagonistic .•.. In 'Tovip', his 
17 August speech in 1965, less than two months before the 
I October 1965 affair, he described the tense situation 
at the time as follows: 
"And now they ore also saying that Indonesia will 
collapse in October. Yes, indeed, the enemy's cunning 
attempts at subversion ore continuing ••• And they are 
already predicting that in a month's time, some time 
during that month, Sukarno will fall, there will be no 
more Sukarno. I have written proof of this." 
Because of grave internal weaknesses, the PKI which 
clearly supported the policies of the Sukarno Government 
did not take the appropriate steps to surmount the 
serious situation. On the contrary, some A<I leaders, 
totally disregarding organisational procedures, became 
involved in an act of military adventurism that was not 
based on the consciousness and conviction of the masses 
of the people. 
(Some) right-wing generals then combined forces in a 
body called the Council of Generals which planned a coup 
against the lawful Indonesian government under President 
Sukarno. The Council of Generals was not on issue created 
by the PKI. It was a reality, and quite logically so, 
considering the political situation at the time. If it 
were possible to bring D.N. Aidit before the court to 
testify as a witness, he would certainly be able to 
explain the process of events leading up to the Council 
of Generals' coup conspiracy. If the judiciary in 
Indonesia were independent and impartial, should the 
courts not also investigate the right-wing generals who 
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were members of the Council of Generals in order to bring 
everything out into the open? 
The Council of Generals' plan of action against 
President Sukarno provoked a response among younger Army 
officers who were intent upon thwarting the coup. As a 
political party which supported President Sukarno, the 
A<I defended the lawful government. Events moved fast. US 
imperialism and the CIA used splitting tactics, they had 
plenty of experience in destroying patriotic and 
democratic forces in many countries and worked to 
aggravate domestic tensions. 
The younger officers were very worried about President 
Sukarno's safety; they became agitated not only in their 
hearts but also in their heads at a time when they should 
have remained cool-headed. Things got out of control when 
they took action to thwart the Council's plan for a co.up 
on 5 October 1965. All their pent-up anger finally broke 
loose In an action that became known as the 1 October 
Movement (Gerakan 1 October, or Gestok, subsequently 
called the 30 Septerrber Movement or Gerd<an 30 September, 
G30S) under Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, a battalion 
commander of the presidential guards, the Cakrabirowa 
Regiment. 
Many people ask whether it is true that the A<I planned 
the G30S. The question has arisen because some A<.I 
leaders, including D.N. Aidit, chairman of the PKI 
Central Committee, were involved in it. People therefore 
believe that the PKI must have been behind it. The PK1 as 
a party has never had the chance to explain publicly the 
true facts of the case. On the other hand, the New Order 
whipped up a campaign asserting that the A<I was the 
organiser of the GJOS. 
Investigations will show that the PKI never had the 
slightest intent ion of overthrowing the Sukarno 
gvernment. On the contrary, it defended that government. 
The PKI never plamed any coup, and coups are not the way 
of the people ... or of Marxism-Leninism. 
People ask, but what are the facts about the PKI? 
Anyone who seriously and carefully studies the affair 
will see, from an investigation of all the PKl documents 
rot if ied by PKI congresses, that the G30S along with the 
decrees Issued by its Revolutionary Council was an act of 
military adventurism, it was not the way to establish 
People's Democracy as defined by the A<I Congress. 
Therefore, as an organisation, the PKI was not involved 
in the G30S. Only a few individuals In the A<I leadership 
were Involved in the GJOS. The mass arrest of cadres, 
members and syrrpathisers of the PKI on the pretext of 
Involvement in the GJOS was a major project sponsored by 
US imperialism and the CIA, inspired by the idea of 
exterminating the communists and all democratic and 
patr lot le forces. 
Whose coup was it? 
Who in actual fact carried out a coup d'etat? President 
Sukarno was quick to take action to regain control of the 
crisis. At 11 am on 1 October 1965, he instructed the 
Naval Chief-of-Staff, Vice-Admiral E. Martadinanta to 
order General Suharto, comnander of KOSlRAD (the Army 
Strategic Reserve Command) to report to the 
President/Col'TTT'lander-in-Chiefof the Armed Forces. At the 
same time, President Sukarno appointed General Pronoto 
Reksosamudra as ad interim comnander of the Army and 
General Suharto was charged with the task of restoring 
order. On the same day, the Information Department of the 
Army HQ announced that for the time being, the leadership 
of the Army was in the hands of General Suharto. This 
announcement was signed by General Suharto himself. Never 
before in the life of the Army have there been two formal 
decisions taken simaltaneously about the leadership. The 
President's odjudant, Colonel Bombang Widjanarko was 
ordered to instruct General Unar Wirahadikusuma, 
comnonder of the Jakarta Military Col'TTT'land, who was 
already at KOSlRAD, to report to the President. General 
Suharto told Colonel Bambang Widjanarko that General Umar 
could not report to the President. 
Acts of Insubordination were committed over and over 
again. General A.H. Nasution (Armed Forces Ch ief of 
Stoff) was by this time together with the others at 
KOSlRAD. The order issued by the President /Commander - in -
Chief for a cease-fire was obeyed by the GJOS but not by 
KOSlRAQ. These generals began to reveal their disloyalty 
to the President by refusing to obey his orders. Using 
the GJOS as the pretext, they began to show that they 
were prepared to go against the President's orders, and 
this was to have far-reaching consequences. 
Suharto, still a lieutenant-general in 1965, and cornnander 
of Kostrad, the Army Strategic Cornnand, with Colonel Sarwo 
Edhie. corrmander of the para-corrmandos, the RA<AD, who 
spear-headed the massacres in 1965-66. The RA<AD were the 
main troops under Suharto's corrmand when he seized power. 
While a cabinet meeting was in progress [on 11 March 
1966 ], the Palace was surrounded by troops not wearing 
any insignia who subsequently turned out to be para-
col'TTT'landos(RPKAD). The President and Dr Subandrio flew to 
safety in a helicopter and took refuge in Bogor. In The 
Smiling General (page 46), O.E Roeder writes that, acting 
on the orders of General Suharto, a delegation consisting 
of Generals Basuki R:ichmat, A. Jusuf and Amir Machmud 
left Jakarta at 14.00 hours to see the President i~ 
B09or, and told him of the need to create a calm and 
stable atmosphere for the government and for the 
continuation of the revolution. This could only be 
achieved by transferring power from the President to 
General Suharto. Going against the advice of his two 
closest advisers, Dr Subondrio and Chaerul Saleh, the 
President finally handed over powers and signed 0 
document later known as on 'Instruction' or 'Order' 
(Surat Per int oh), tronsferr ing executive powers to 
General Suharto. 
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Gatot's defence statement 
A demonstration outside the Indonesian Embassy in London 
on 30 May, 1985. 
lhe 11 March 1966 Order 
The president signed the 11 March Order not of his own 
free will but because he was forced to do so under armed 
threat. General Suharto assumed the re ins of s tote power 
by means of the 11 March Order. 
I now come to the question of the use of the Supersemar 
(acronym for the 11 Much Order) to outlaw the FKI. The 
authority that was used to outlaw the PK.I was the 
Supersemar. Yet, laws were already in force specifically 
regulating the political parties, Presidential Decrees 
7/1959 and 13/1960. Thus, if measures are to be taken 
ago inst a political party, the only grounds are 
Presidential Decrees 7/1959 and 13/1960, not the 
Supersemar. I repeat, not the Supersemar. Supersemar is 
neither a law nor a piece of legislation, it is an order. 
The MPRS decree endorsing the Supersemar was 
unconstitutional, it was an infringement of the 1945 
Constitution. 
Perhaps, it may be argued, it was a law based on 
emergency conditions. This is not possible either because 
(a) the emergency conditions were brought on by those who 
used force to demand the Order; at the very least, there 
was blatant collaboration between those who surrounded 
the Palace and those who demanded the Supersemar. And (b) 
the emergency conditions were therefore nothing more than 
a pretext .... There was no emergency except that used as 
a pretext by those who forced the President to issue the 
Supersemar, which was the 'starting point' of an act of 
rebellion. It can be stated and formally proven by law 
that the Supersemar was an act of rebellion. The most 
convincing proof is that the President was removed from 
power; he was interrogated, his ministers were arrested, 
members of the MPRS and the DPR3) were arrested, and 
arrests have continued to the present day ..•• Is this not 
a coup? 
Thus not only should the actions taken on the basis of 
the Supersemar be revoked, including the MFRS decision to 
endorse the Supersemar, the dissolution of the PKI and 
the creation of KOFKAMTIB (Operational Corrmand for the 
Restoration of Security and Order), but legal action 
should be taken against the 
implementing the Supersemar 
committing criminal offences. 
lhe 1965-66 massacres 
person 
far he 
in charge of 
is guilty of 
I now want to speak about brutality and sadism. The 
civilised world was shocked by the horrendous sadism of 
the crimes that were sponsored by the fascist military 
regime. Things occurred that no-one could ever hove 
imagined would happen in Indonesia, a country whose 
people are regarded in the West as "the most genteel 
people in the world". While it is not good to look back, 
we should learn from history. To speak truthfully, I am 
very reluctant to speak about those ghastly events, but I 
do so because ten years on, the country's rulers still 
justify the terror, savagery and slaughter as being 
worthwhile as long as the objective of exterminating the 
FKI and overthrowing Sukarno was achieved. They hove 
shown not the slightest sense of moral responsibility to 
investigate the massacres, or at the very least to call 
to account those who were in positions of authority at 
the time. Nor have they done anything to prevent a 
repetition of what happened. 
These sadistic crimes have never been condemned, let 
alone anyone charged by the people now in power. With the 
protection of the security forces who would never have 
acted in the way they did without the approval of tneir 
anti-conrnunist superiors, groups which supported the 
right-wing Army generals ran wild everywhere. Spurred on 
by stories of eyes being gouged out and of obscene 
practices said to hove taken place at l-lolim Airbase, of 
genitals being sloshed (never proven by any doctor's 
autopsy), of claims that the GJOS hod dug (groves}4}, and 
by slogans proclaiming that far every murdered general, 
100,000 communists should pay with their lives, a white 
terror was unleashed and sadistic crimes were committed 
everywhere. Hundreds of thousands of communists and non-
communists, men, women, youngsters and even children fell 
victim to a wave of unparalleled barbarism. 
Acts of sadism, unimaginably inh1.XT1an acts of torture, 
were perpetrated at the time of the massacres. An entire 
family was murdered, the children first, one by one, in 
front of the parents, then the wife and husband were 
killed. A pregnant women who happened to be the village 
head was murdered. Mothers clutching their babies were 
slaughtered on river banks. Contests were held. Anyone 
who was able to slice a person in half from top to bottom 
in the single blow of an axe would qualify far extra 
payments (this happened in Singosari}. Many murders took 
place on the river banks to ovoid the need far digging 
graves. Human heads were hung out in market-places, in 
front of houses, along the roadside; some were even 
daubed with chalk. Women's corpses with babies suckling 
at the breast were thrown into the River Brantas. In 
Bengawon Solo Canal (Bojonegoro District}, dozens of 
bodies were tied together and used as a raft. There was a 
bridge near Dabat (?} where many people were slaughtered. 
The many marks of dried-up human blood going down the 
side of the bridge was a telling reminder of how many 
people had been slaughtered there. 
Some people were subjected to a slow death; their limbs 
were chopped off one by one. Others were farced to jump 
down into trenches, called 'Luweng'. In one prison, 
virulently anti -conrnuni st government troops ordered 
detainees to jul"ll> off a high platform head first. It was 
a miracle for anyone to have survived this ordeal. 
Penises were cut off and used to prove how many people a 
person hod killed when demanding their pay. 
These acts of extermination cannot be described as 
excesses, as an outburst by the masses. They were well-
organised, planned and premeditated. This is evident from 
the fact that everywhere, in all parts of the country, 
the massacres were torgetted not only against ordinary 
people but also against local PKI leaders down to the 
village level. Those targetted included leaders of the 
mass organisations, members of district assemblies (DFRD) 
and of district executive organs, district heads, 
journalists, businessmen, lawyers and intellectuals. 
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'lndikasi' hos been used to arrest at random anyone 
considered undesirable. Sadistic methods ore then used 
during interrogation, including severe beatings, 
electrical torture, isolation and a diet that brings on 
paralysis. Detainees' relatives who know nothing at all 
about the affair are subjected to pressure and 
intimidation, and threats of blackmail, ill-treated to 
destroy their morale, so as to inflict psychological 
pressure on the unfortunate topol. Such treatment is 
meted out not only to men but to women as well, who often 
suffer the added indignity of being raped. 
Having perpetrated such methods in the ncrne of the 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the rulers have 
created the myth of 'new style PKI members' who are 
accused of 'giving guidance' and on the basis of 
'indikasi'. To this very day, after almost eleven years, 
all this intolerable treatment of the tapols is still 
continuing. 
The trials 
The trials. being conducted are clearly pursuing a 
'projected target', aimed at proving that the abortive 
G30S was planned and supported by the PKI with the help 
of democratic mass organisations and civilian and 
military officials said to have been 'under PKI 
guidance'. The people to be tr led and the sequence in 
which the trials are held is arranged in such a way as to 
confirm the New Order's own construction of events. As 
many people as possible have been accused of playing a 
leading role, and each of them is expected to testify 
against others. 
On numerous occasions, my comrades have told court 
hearings in Jakarta and elsewhere about detainees who 
have died as a result of being tortured during 
interrogation and of the inhuman treatment of prisoners 
in the detention camps. One tapol had no alternative but 
to confess to anything because he could not stood the 
sadistic torture to which he was subjected. The mal-
treatment of women is particularly sadistic. In some 
places, these poor women are stripped naked and put on a 
platform during interrogations conducted at night, with a 
bright petromax lanp shining on them. Some women have 
been dragged around markets naked. S001e have hod their 
vaginas burned or electrified, or have hod bottles pushed 
up the"TI. Some topols hove been dragged behind trucks. 
Some have become so desperate, going in and out of prison 
as victims of blackmail, that they hove corrmi tted 
suicide. 
In the eyes of the fascist militarists, no violation of 
the law in involved because the victims are seen as 
obstacles to their policies who must be mercilessly 
annihilated, even though there are people in positions of 
authority who have acknowledged that ideology cannot be 
stomped out by means of violence or by force of arms. 
Since the PKI is regarded as a 'latent danger', 
KOPKAMTIB must stay in existence indefinitely. State 
Department and Pentagon officials often praise Indonesia 
as the 'free world's' strongest bastion in Southeast Asia 
now that Indonesia's corrmunists and democrats have been 
successfully crushed and paralysed and at such low cost. 
When the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia) 
raised certain objections about granting more credit 
because they were pressing for more favourable 
conditions, Foreign Minister Adam Molik's smart response 
was; "Yes, but we succeeded brilliantly in crushing the 
communists without them forking out a single dollar." 
The South Blitar affair 
I now come to the South Blitar question. What was the 
South Blltar Affair and how did it happen? As I said in a 
previous hearing a few days ago, the South Blitar Affair 
occurred as the consequence of the overthrow of the 
Sukarno government by General Suharto, as the consequence 
of corrmunists being placed outside the low, making it 
possible for them to be murdered with impunity, as the 
consequence of the barbarous white terror that was 
unleashed everywhere. This meant that there was no 
alternative for corrmunists but to defend themselves and 
resist. Is it c001prehensible for anyone to face disaster 
without doing something? Is it not understandable for 
people placed in such circumstances to escape from 
danger, to defend themselves as best they can and to 
resist in an effort to survive, in other words, to refuse 
to die in vain. It is a natural human instinct to defend 
one's own life, it is perfectly understandable when all 
other paths are closed except self-defence, to make a 
stand against the armed strength of a blood-soaked, 
counter-revolutionary government, to toke up arms In 
self-defence. 
The South Blitar Affair was forced upon us by the 
armed counter-revolution. Armed confrontration occurred 
because of the natural human instinct to defend one's 
existence when cornered in a position of extreme 
adversity. Had there been no bloody oppression, 
unparalleled in history for its barbarism, South Blitar 
or anything like it would never have happened in such a 
short space of time. Because of the ideological 
weaknesses that afflicted the PKI, no-one would have 
taken such an initiative of their own free will, 
abandoning city life and moving into villages, still less 
vi Hages like those l n South Blitar where the soi I is 
barren. 
Tyranny had gained the upper hand, corrmunists hod been 
placed outside the protection of the law, the Sukarno 
government hod been overthrown and replaced by the anti-
corrmunist Suhartogovernrrent and armed counter-revolution 
was on the rampage. These were the circumstances that 
forced surviving A<.1 members to go to the villages and 
unite with the poor peasants in South Blitar. Being 
political workers who had always regarded it as their 
life's work to serve the interests of the people, the 
country crid the Indonesian revolution, the PKI cadres who 
made their way to South Blitar did not remain idle, 
resting their chins on their hands. While protecting 
themselves against constant attempts to track them down, 
the PKI cadres learned to live in the villages, which was 
altogether different from living in the city. They 
integrated themselves with the poor peasants and farm 
labourers. 
The (Army's) pursuit operations grew in intensity. 
South Bli tar was blockaded and casualties began to fall. 
The homes of the peasants were burnt to the ground; no 
houses or huts escaped these operations. The peasants 
were forced to move out onto the roads. They were no 
longer able to till their fields because the operations 
gripped the area like a vice. Cassava gardens were cut to 
pieces to prevent corrmunists using them as hiding places. 
Confronted by such a level of operations, the only 
alternatives were to surrender and be killed or to defend 
oneself, md<:e best use of the opportunities avaiioble and 
break through the encirclement. 
The military regime accused 
This court of the Indonesian military regime may regard 
me as the accused, but in the court of history, with the 
entire people acting as witnesses. I stand here as the 
accuser for all the er Imes against humanity already 
committed, now being ccrrmitted or still to be COl'TTT'litted 
by the present regime against the Indonesian people, 
against members of the PKI and the mass organisations, 
against the so-called 'remnants', in short, against all 
Indonesian patriots and democrats of whatever group, 
wherever they ore. 
I demand that the person responsible for this regime 
should be tried for the crime of genocide. I call upon 
this court to initiate an investigation of the mass 
murders which I have spoken about repeatedly. I demand 
that all the political prisoners should be released and 
that all the torture perpetrated against the prisoners 
should stop immediately. As I hove already said, the vast 
majority of those who ore still languishing in prisons, 
in places of detentions, in exile camps, are being held 
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because the i r politics are different from those of the 
regime now in power. 
I firmly believe that the Indonesian people are the 
mighty creators of h istory. Truth and justice will surely 
win. The present dark ages are only temporary. Unite, 
Indonesian people, in the corrrnon struggle for democracy, 
national independence and social justice. 
Blitar, 26 December 1975 
Harassment of ex-prisoners 
1) Kalisosok is t he pr i son in Surabaya where Ga tot was 
held up to the time of his trial. t of 
2 ) G 30S, Ge r akan 30 September or 30 September M ave men 
1965. t a the 3 ) MPRS , Majelis Pemusyawaratan Rakyat Semen ar • 
provisional People ' s Consultative Assembly or upper 
house . DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, the People's 
Representative Assembly, or low er house. . 
4 ) dug (grave s ). ' holea' is impl~ed, referri".'g to the 
well at Lubang Buaya or Crocodiles' Hal~ sitl!ated at 
Halim Airbase where the murdered generals bodies were 
found. The a'ssociation between 'holes' and 'g~aves' 
supposedly dug by PKI members. was frequently made in the 
anti-PK! propaganda of the time. 
"Restoring voting rights" is the 
excuse for new controls 
Follow i ng the announcement (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, Juli] 1985) that 1.7 million former po~itical prisoners held f~r 
alleged involvement in the 1965 events are being re-registered to determine whether they will be allowed to vote ~n 
elections a Presidential Decision has now been issued setting down the procedures to be used. The new arrangements will 
subject ;hese men and women to yet more supervision and harassment, reinforcing their status as second-class citizens 
without civil rights. 
Following the announcement (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, 
July 1985) that 1.7 million former political prisoners 
held for alleged involvement in the 1965 events are being 
re-registered to determine whether they will be allowed 
to vote in elections, a Presidential Decision has now 
been issued setting down the procedures to be used. The 
new arrangements will subject these men and women to yet 
more supervision and harassment, reinforcing their status 
as second-class citizens without civil rights. 
All people designated as hoving been 'involved in the 
GJOS/PKI affair' who will be subject to these procedures 
are classified into three categories. (These same 
categories were used when they were political prisoners.) 
A-Category are those who were "clearly directly 
involved in the GJOS/PKI". 
B-Category are those who were "clearly indirectly 
involved in the GJOS/PKI". 
C-Category are those regarding whom "there are 
indications, or it can reasonably be assumed, that they 
were directly or indirectly involved in the GJOS/PKI". 
Categories A and 8 can be considered for restoration of 
their right to vote provided they completed their 
sentences or terms of detention - appropriated validated 
by the competent authorities - at least one year before 
voters are required to register. (Category A meant that 
the person detained was to be tried, though not all of 
them were; Category B meant they could not be tried for 
lack of 'ev idence' but were nevertheless detained 
indefinitely . Tens of thousands of those classified as C 
were also detained for many years despite official 
pronouncements that they were not to be detained 
indefinitely.) 
Dual or treble control at every stage 
For the purposes of deciding who may vote, the village 
or kampung head (lurah) together with the territorial 
army officer at that level (babinsa) must compile a list 
of all persons in their area, giving recommendations for 
each individual. These lists must be sent to the 
provincial governor through the intermediary officials 
for further investigation. Each of the intermediary local 
gover1TT1ent officials (camat or sub-district head, bupati 
or district head and mayor in the case of urban areas) 
t ogether with the mi Ii tary commanding officer and police 
chief at each level will attach their own recommendations 
to all the names on the lists before passing them on. 
The names will then be sent to the Minister of the 
Interior, with a report on each individual accompanied by 
the results of all these investigations and bearing the 
Political prisoners at a 'release' ceremony in 1979. 
signature of the provincial governor and the appropriate 
military commanding officer in his capacity asKOPKAMTIB 
executive officer (Laksus Pangkopkamtibda). To assist 
these officials in toking their decisions, Level-I 
Consideration Teams will be set up in each province, 
while a Central Consideration Team will be set up to 
assist the Interior Minister and theKOPKAMTIB Corrrnander-
in-Chief in making their final determination. 
The investigations will be carried out, "person by 
person, selectively and meticulously, based on security 
considerations". The criteria are that the person in 
question "has shown loyalty and obedience to the nation, 
state and government of Indonesia based on the 1945 
Constitution and the Pancasila, hos not disseminated the 
teachings of Communism/Marxism/Leninism in any form or 
shape, has not engaged in any activity disrupting 
security or political stability, has complied with oil 
regulations issued by KOPKAMTIB regarding government 
policy to maintain stability, security and order, and has 
obeyed all the laws in force". 
This vicious new regulation which shows the regime's 
determination to go on hounding leftwing suspects twenty 
years after their organisations were banned was issued on 
5 September. (Kompos, 10 September) 
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New anti-conmunist hysteria unleashed 
The Military regime has unleashed a new ccrnpaign of anti-
cornnunist hysteria, warning in well-publicised statements 
that the PKI (Indonesian Corrrnunist Party) was never 
'totally uprooted', that many of its members 'evaded 
arrest' with the result that the party must continue to 
be regarded as a 'latent danger'. 
The hysteria provides the regime with justification for 
the moss re-registration of former political prisoners 
reported in TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, July 1985. It also 
serves as a warning to many people at a time when there 
are signs of growing social unrest in various parts of 
the country. 
Central and East Java appear to have been singled out 
for special attention, with claims being made by the 
military corrrnonder of Central Java and senior civil 
ocrninistrators (most of whom ore military men) that 'ex-
A<I members' have started a "closed-mouth" (tutup mulut) 
movement, whatever that means. The movement is said to be 
getting help from abroad and is alleged to have been 
responsible for persuading the European Parliament to 
adopt a resolution protesting against the execution of 
Moharnnad Munir in Moy this year. 
Central Java is said to be particularly 'threatened' 
because official sources claim that there are 200,000 
(according to one newspaper), or 290,000 (according to 
another) former A<I topols in the province. The Governor 
claimed that most of these people are concentrated in the 
districts of Boyolali and Purwodadi. Several sub-
distrlcts, including Grobogan, Demak, Kudus, Pati 
Rembang, Jepara and Bloro ore mentioned as being 'in need 
of special vigilance', because 'A<I remnants' allegedly 
use cultural activities, crime and other forms of 
violence to advance their political aims. Such remarks 
suggest that people in these areas are giving expression 
to their discontent in a variety of ways. 
General Surano, Minister-Coordinator for Social and 
Political Affairs gave his stamp of approval to the 
hysteria with a statement in Semarang that ''many A<I 
cadres have evaded arrest" and others who were abroad 
have "slipped back'' illegally, using "cunning camouflage" 
to hide their identity. (Kedaulatan Rd<yat, Semarang, 8 
August) 
"So, how many have you arrested?'' he was asked. "I 
haven't been able to count and can't give details but 
rest assured, arrests have been made." I-le claimed that 
the current alleged A<I actions first began to be felt in 
Central ..bvo, a A<I stronghold in pre-1965 days. The be6t 
way to grapple with this 'latent danger', he said, is to 
re-register all ex-A<I members/former prisoners. ''There 
ore so many of them that if we don't collect concrete 
data about their lives, they can pose a real threat." 
Checking on people's relatives 
NewshasreachedTAPOLabout a questionnaire government 
employees in East Java ore required to fill in, giving 
details about the post political affiliations of their 
parents, parents-in-law, uncles and aunts and other 
relatives. Three lecturers at the Teachers' Academy in 
Molang were dismissed when it was revealed that their 
fathers had been members of one or other of the moss 
organisations banned in 1965. 
[T APOL Bullet in, No 68, March 1985, page 24 records the 
case of a man who was declared ineligible to stand for 
re-election as village head when it was discevered that 
his (deceased) brother-In-low was a member of the 
outlawed teachers union, P<Rl-NV.] 
Corroborating this latest twist in Indonesian witch-
hunting, Surabaya Pos (5 August) reports that intensive 
'screening' of regional goverrment employees hos been 
under way, on the instructions of the Governor of East 
Java. Several university graduates occupying various 
positions were dismissed, reports ~s, when it was 
discovered that their fathers had been murdered in 1965 
in the anti-GJOS/A<l wave of mass killings when hundreds 
of thousands were slaughtered for alleged 'A<I 
involvement'. Such is the 'justice' meted out to the 
children of men and women murdered in the anti-corrrnunist 
massacres of the late 1960s. In civilised countries, such 
people would be eligible for compensation, not liable to 
dismissal. 
The same paper also reports that a senior official of 
the Lumajang district administration was recently 
dismissed for alleged GJOS/A<I involvement back in pre-
1965 days. 
Grobogan villagers flee from village head 
For a different view of conditions in Grobagan, one of 
the sub-districts on the regime's list of 'A<I 
troublespots', Ka11>0s (19 August) reports that 30 
peasants and their families have fled from a village in 
the sub-district because of constant intimidation by the 
village head, identified as 'Swt'. 
They tell stories of being beaten up, kicked and even 
given electric shock by the official for the flimsiest of 
reasons. He also attempted to rape a woman in the village 
but was only prevented from doing so by the intervention 
of her husband. 
Other families have also left the village in despair at 
the behaviour of the village head who has been in charge 
there s Ince 1979. Many who could not afford to move to 
other villages decided to accept transmigration rather 
than continue to be terrorised by him. 
It appears that the trouble with 'Swt' is that he uses 
terror to force 'development' activities on the 
villagers. A more senior, district official confirmed to 
Kompas that 'Swt' imposes harsh discipline in his 
village. "But it's not as bad as they make out, just 
occasional beatings," he said. Under 'Swt', the village 
has an excellent development record . There was no 
initiative before he took control so his vigorous 
programme came as a shock to the villagers, many of whom 
couldn't stand it and decided to leave. "It's just a case 
of difficulties that normally arise between father and 
children (sic) and shouldn't be exaggerated." 
What the official didn't say was that the regime has a 
history of violence in Grobogan district which, together 
with neighbouring Purwodadi, was a region where many 
thousands of alleged cornnunists were slaughtered in 1969, 
when the campaign of massacres that climaxed in 1965/66 
was resumed for a few months. 
New books on order from TAPOL rr:========ii 
Olle Tourquist, Dilerrmos 
of Third World 
Communism. The 
Destruction of the PKI 
in Indonesia. 
Discount price: £5.00 
Plus postage: 
U<, Europe and overseas/ 
sea: £1.00 
Overseas airmail: £4.50 OLL t fORNQlllST 
Amnesty International, 
East Timor, Violations 
of t-bnan Rights. 
Price: £2.00 
Plus postage: 
UK, Europe and 
overseas/sea: £0.75 
Overseas airmail: 
£2.25 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985 11 
Eilropeara Parlianent hits Indonesia again 
Following the official confirmation that three more long-term political prisoners were executed in East Java at the 
beginning of July, the European Parliament adopted two more resolutions of condemnation on 12 September. (Two resolutions 
were adopted in June. See TA POL Bulletin No. 70, July 1985) One calls into question the whole range of EEC economic 
relations with Indonesia in the light of the executions. The texts are as follows: 
The European Parliament., 
A. dismayed by the executions of the political prisoners 
Ruslan Widjajasastra, Gatot Lestario, Djok.o llntung and 
Rustomo, 1) 
8. whereas, in its resolution of 10 June 1985, it had 
already e'<pressed its horror at the execution on 14 Hay 
1985 of Mohammad Munir, U1e trade unionist and former 
member of parliament after sixteen years in prison, 
1. Condemns such death sentences and executions on the 
basis of universal human rights and rejects them as 
political murders; 
2. Calls on the Commission to provide the European 
Parliament as quickly as possible with precise 
information on economic relations with Indonesia; 
.3. Calls on the Commission to submit proposals for a 
critical reappraisal of these relations in the light of 
this unacceptable violation of human rights in Indonesia; 
4. Calls on the Council of Ministers to urge the 
governments of the Member States to review their 
development relations with Indonesia critically, in 
particular within the IGGI, in view of this violation of 
human rights; 
5. Calls on the Council of Minist;ers to ask the 
Government of Indonesia for a full explanation of the 
reasons for these executions, for clarification on the 
position of government opponents still held in prison 
under sentence of death and the Indonesian Government's 
intention to grant them an amnesty and to release them; 
6. Calls on the C 01mcil of H inisters to make the 
subsequent restoration of economic relations specifically 
dependent on these releases; 
7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to 
the Commission, the Council, the governments and 
Parliaments of the Member States and the President of 
Indonesia. 
The European Parliament., 
A. recalling its resolution of 12 June 1985, in which it 
urged the Indonesian Government to do everything in its 
power to prevent the death sentence an four trade union 
leaders being carried out, 
8. having learnt that at least three of these trade 
unionists have been executed by the militarlj regime in 
Indonesia, 
C. whereas these executions are contrary to the 
underta.ki ngs given by the lndanesian representatives at 
the EE C-ASEA N parliamentary meeting during the July part-
sessian, 
O. whereas seventeen other people condemned to death for 
their trade union activities are threatened with 
execution under the same circumstances, 
J. Is outraged at the executions that have already taken 
place; 
2. Expresses its solidarity with all democrats and all 
victims of human rights violations in lndonersia, 
irrespective of their political beliefs, race or social 
group; 
.3. Calls on the Foreign Ministers of the ten Member 
States of the European Community meeting in political 
cooperation to bring every possible pressure to bear on 
the Indonesian Government ta prevent these executions; 
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution ta 
the Indonesian Government, the Commission, the Council 
and the Foreign Ministers of the Member States. 
I )Rvslan Widjajasastra was not executed in July 
Powerful City of London mission visits lndo.nesia 
The Lord Mayor and the British anbassador with Suharto 
Sir Alon Traill, the Lord Moyor of 
London, headed a mission of leading city 
bankers, insurance directors and 
merchants on a visit to Indonesia in 
Aug•.ist. The mission included the deputy 
chairman of the Stondmd and Chartered 
Bonk, the chairman of Poterson-Zochonis, 
the Far East advisor to Williams and 
Glyns Bank, the chairman of the S.E. 
Asia Advisory Group of the British 
Overseas Trade Boord, and the secretory 
of the S.E. Section Corrmittee of the 
LondonChamberofCorrmerce and Industry. 
The mission's visit was arranged when 
J.B. Hobibie, Indonesia's Minister for 
Research and Technology, visited London 
in June. 
The present Lord Mayor appears to hove 
considerable business interests of his 
own in Indonesia as he regularly visits 
the country. Prior to his visit as Lord 
Mayor, he had already visited Indonesia 
three times. 
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Muslims on trial 
"Freeing ourselves from fear" 
Syfl.fruddin Prawiranegara, a former Finance Minister, is chairman of Korps Nubaligh Indonesi a , the Indonesian Lay-
Preachers Corps, many of whose board members are now on trial or under arrest. He has been a member of the dissident 
Petition-of-50 Group since its inception in 1980. The following extract is from a sermon he gave on ldul Fithri i n June 
this year. He was later interrogated by the Jakarta Military Command, whose commander then announced tha t this 
"extremist" sermon might result in his being brought to trial. Syafruddin has in any case been mentioned as a likely 
defendant in the "Petition-of-50" trials that commenced in August with the trial of Lieutenant-General (retired) H.R. 
Dharsono. 
Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar! 
Whilst not forgetting the debts and fines we must still 
pay, we can look back with joy because we have completed 
the task of cleansing our spirits well. But if we look 
ahead, I don't know how many of us still feel happy. If 
we look outside - which is a better way of putting it 
than saying ahead - Indonesia's world appears to be 
clouded in a black fog or mist. We can therefore only see 
the situation and events nearer at hand with some 
clarity. We cannot see the situation and events that are 
farther away, and all we can do is make guesses. 
Up to now, we have been paying less attention to the 
world outside us. During the month of Ramadhan, we have 
been busy straightening ourselves up and cleansing 
ourselves, listening to Ramadhan lectures and so on. ldul 
Fi thri marks not only the conclusion of the Ramadhan fast 
but also the beginning of life and normal pursuits, it 
marks the "struggle for life" (original, Eng.) which for 
believers must be fought in accordance with the corrrnands 
of Allah s.w.t. concerning that which is our right and 
that which is not, that which is permitted and that which 
is forbidden. 
And it is precisely this which is so difficult to do 
because Indonesia's world is clouded in a black fog. This 
black fog is caused by feelings of fear, fear to express 
opinions and fear to report the truth, fear that these 
opinions and reports will not please certain government 
circles. 
The majority of people who signed the ''White Paper" on 
the Tanjung Priok tragedy in September 1984 which called 
for a "fact-finding corrrnission" (original. Eng.) to 
investigate that affair have been interrogated by public 
prosecutors regarding their reasons for signing that 
document. A senior official called the "White Paper" an 
underground pamphlet even though the names and addresses 
of the signatories were clearly stated and most of them 
played an important role in the independence struggle. 
The signatories of the ''White Paper" faced their 
interrogators without fear because their aim was not to 
bred< the law. On the contrary, their aim was to seek and 
uphold truth and justice in line with the demands of 
Article 27, paragraph 1 of the Constitution. But 
outsiders wonder, with fear in their hearts: why should 
people be interrogated for days just because of a thing 
like that. 
In short, the Tanjung Priok tragedy plus the Bank 
Central Asia bombing incidents and the way the courts 
treated those who were accused of involvement in those 
events have only strengthened the fears and anxieties 
that grip ordinary people, particularly the Muslim 
corrrnunlty. Fear of expressing what is in their hearts, 
and fear of reporting the truth (about things that) 
violate the law and which the authorities who are 
responsible for the enforcement of law and justice ought 
to know about. If such a state of affairs drags on, the 
goverrment itself will get confused because it will not 
know what is true and what is not true, and what should 
be done. And one day, it could be faced with some very 
unexpected shocks. 
In truth, both the ones who are afraid and that which 
causes their fears are victims of the temptations and 
trickery of the vile devil, and are hostages to the 
devil. And who is it who can liberate us from the yoke of 
this vile devil? Only Him, the only right and powerful 
One, almighty Allah s.w.t. 
Alldhu akbar, Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar! 
Dear Muslim brothers and sisters, 
If we want to help rid society of this feeling of fear, 
we should stand by the following principles: 
First, the struggle to rid society of fear which means 
struggling to uphold justice and truth involves taking 
the risk that we may be arrested, imprisoned and possibly 
tortured. Therefore, let us struggle of our own free will 
and with our own strength, relying solely upon Allah 
s.w.t. Finally, Allah Himself explained to us: 
''Whosoever does good will experience his/her own merit 
and whosoever caTITiits crime will bear his/her own 
punishment." 
Naturally, others can JOln us as long as they 
understand and approve of the aims of our struggle, and 
are conscious of the dangers inherent in the said 
struggle. 
Second, if we want to uphold truth and justice, 
violence should not be used except in self-defence. 
Violent will not bring improvements, it will not alter 
other people' opinions and convictions: , but will only 
invite more violence •.•• 
Guidelines for preaching in Indonesia 
A set of guidelines for 
prerJchers was published by 
Syafruddin Prawiranegara, 
Chairman of the Korps 
Mubaligh Indonesia, in April 
this year. It is aimed at 
advisingKMI members on how 
to convey their religious 
message in keeping with the 
basic Islamic outlook of 
preserving the link between 
its religious message and 
its social message, despite 
the risks this .involves at 
Syafruddin Prawiranegara the present time. 
Preachers are required to 
advise their congregations on all matters pertaining to 
their social conditions while avoiding direct accusations 
against persons responsible for the difficulties faced, 
unless under exceptional circumstances. When differences 
of opinion arise with anyone (including those in power), 
as for example over the goverrment's insistence on 
Pancasila as the sole principle, Syafruddin stresses that 
it is their duty to make their views clear and name those 
with whom they disagree. 
The guidelines also deal with attitudes towards criminal 
elements, and condemns attempts to fight crime by means 
of violence, an obvious reference to the activities of 
the Army's death-squads. Crime can only be dealt with by 
tackling the social diseases of poverty and unemployment. 
Preachers not only need to understand Islamic teachings. 
They also need to understand worldly affairs. "Our 
younger members should prepare themselves for a more 
significant role than the. kiyai and ulmia most of whom 
only know about religious affairs." 
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Muslims on trial 
On trial for ''subversive'' lecturing 
One clear target of Ule manlJ trials now under walj in Jakarta is the Korps Mubaligh Indonesia (KMI), the organisation of 
Muslim la1J-preachers (mubaligh) whose chairman, Sjafruddin Pra wiranega.ra is himself likely to be tried soon. Mani} oU>er 
members of the KMI central board are under arrest or on trial, including Mawardi Noor, Oeputlj General Chairman, A.H. 
Fatwa and Haji Salim Kadar, Second and Third Chairmen, and board members Abdul O.adir Djaelani and Tony Ardhi. 
Hoj i Salim Kadar and Vayon Hendrayaya 
The first of the KMI preachers to come for trial were 
Haj i Salim Kadar (50), arrested on 18 Septembe'r 1984, and 
Yayan Hendrayana (35), former secretary-general of the 
KMI Jakarta branch and assistant lecturer at the Islamic 
Dakwah (missionary) College, PDTI, who has been under 
arrest since 1 October 1984. Both are accused of having 
'directly incited' the Tanjung Priok incident on 12 
Septerrber last year with their 'inflarrmatory speeches'. 
Their trials corrmenced on 20 July and are taking place 
concurrently, with a largely similar list of witnesses 
being called by the prosecutor. Both men were also 
summoned to testify at each other's trials. 
A number of the witnesses are members of the security 
forces who were assigned to spy on the two men from 30 
June till 10 September 1984, that is, for several months 
before the Tanjung Priok massacre. (Suara Karyq 17 July) 
They go out of their way to suggest that both men were 
very popular indeed and addressed huge crowds. Thus, for 
instance, Suara Koryo (9 July), the GOLKAR daily, in a 
lengthy 'leak' in advance of the trial, quotes one source 
as saying that Salim addressed a gathering of 10,000 on 
18 August, another of 25,000 on 29 August, another of 
30,000 on 1 September and yet another shortly afterwards 
of 40,000. One witness even told the court later on that 
the meeting addressed by Salim and Yayan at Tanjung Priok 
on 12 September was attended by 50,000 people {Kompas, 13 
August), contradicting General Benny Murdani's own 
official acccJnt which claimed that 1,500 were present. 
One can only assume that the figures are deliberately 
inflated to eTiphasise the danger these men represent with 
their apparently enormous pull on huge crowds of people. 
Moreover, if the security forces were aware for so long 
before the demonstration in Tanjung Priok that these 
'inflarrmatory' lectures were being given, why were no 
arrests made until after the Tanjung Priok massacre? This 
paradox reinforces the impression that Army intelligence 
was involved in a frame-up calculated to incite a major 
incident so as to charge Muslim critics with acts of 
terror while at the same time inflicting heavy casualties 
as a warning to the Muslim corrmunity as a whole. In the 
meanwhile, intelligence agents, spying on preachers, were 
building up dossiers against the 'extremist lecturers'. 
Salim Kadar 
As for the contents of Salim Kadar's and Yayan 
Hendryaya's lectures, neither men deny charges that they 
spoke out frequently against the Pancasila as the sole-
ideology (though not necessarily against the Pancosila 
itself), that they were critical of the birth control 
progrorrme, of official moves to prevent Muslim school-
girls wearing head-scarves at school, of government-
sponsored Poncosila indoctrination courses (P4) and of 
the general elect ions. 
Both men are also accused of distributing the pamphlet, 
Tega<kon Moralitos Islam Sekalipun Langit Akan 
Roboh (Uphold Islamic 
Morality even if the Skies 
Collapse) and of signing a 
pledge of the Jakarta Muslim 
corrmuni tyre ject ing Pancasilo 
as the sole principle and 
rejecting the Societies Law. 
Prosecutor demands 'life' for 
Vayon 
On 12 September, the 
prosecutor demanded a life 
se nte nee for Yayan for 
"subverting the government 
and the state ideology". 
Another charge was that he 
"accused General Murdani of 
master-minding the so-called 
'mysterious killings' and 
accused the President of 
corruption." Yayan Hendrayana 
Hoji Mawardi Noor 
Haji Mawardi Noor (67), a former parliamentarian for 
the Masjumi party (banned under Sukarno and not allowed 
to re-establish itself under Suharto) and Deputy General 
Chairman of the KMI, was charged with subversion on 16 
September. He is accused of spreading hostility and 
splits in a series of 14 lectures he is said to have 
delivered from late 1983 up to 7 September 1984, in 
mosques as well as other public places in Jakarta. His 
lectures which "condemned the Pancasila-os-the-sole-
principle policy, rejected Poncasilo indoctrination 
courses (P4), rejected school-lessons in Poncasila 
Morality Education, and rejected the present Indonesian 
government" were seen as an attempt "to undermine the 
lawful government". 
Asked whether he understood the indictment, the accused 
wanted to know what the prosecution meant by "undermine". 
A heated discussion ensued with the defence insisting 
that the term would have to be defined before the 
indictment could be properly assessed. The prosecutor 
refused however to explain his meaning, saying that this 
would mean entering into the substance of the case. 
In their demurrer (eksepsi), the defence also asked why 
allegedly subversive lectures delivered by the accused 
had been closely monitored for over nine months yet the 
security forces hod not arrested him until ~fter the 
Tanjung Priok incident. 
The accused rejected prosecution allegations that he 
favours an Islamic state. To reject Pancasila-as-the-
sole-principle does not mean rejecting the Pancasila but 
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simply insisting that state regulations about religion 
should not be in conflict with the lows of the various 
religions. ''The things I said ore being said by other 
mubolighs. These views ore widely held in society. It is 
quite unjust to brand me as a subversive." 
(Kompos, 17 Septerroer) 
More severe sentences in East Java 
Court verdicts against Muslim political prisoners in 
East Jave who ore accused of involvement in a so-called 
'Jihad' (Holy War) Corrrnond ore now coming thick and fast. 
In TAPOL Bulletin No 70, July 1985, we reported five 
sentences that hod been passed by a court in Bojonegoro. 
(See that issue also for on assessment of the regime's 
claims about the 'Jihad' Command.) 
The nine men on trial in Jember, East Java were all 
found guilty and sentenced in late June and and July, as 
follows: Karto, 15 years; Soiful alias Mustafa, 11 years; 
Semoun Effendi, 13 years; Sunorso alias Hasan, 14 years; 
Abdusul<kur, alias Anworhodi, 12 years; Anwar, 4 years; 
Sohor, 14 years; Asdin alias Muharionto, 12 years; and 
Porto alias SolirT} 13 years •. All were found guilty of 
subversion for activities in 1979 and 1980, and to hove 
deviotetJ from the Poncosilo ideology. According to Suoro 
Karyo (18 July), they ore all small formers with little 
education and not fluent in Indonesian. 
In Probolinggo, the following sentences hove been 
passed: Ors Achnod Muhajir, 10 years; Untung Salim al 
'Hendro, 14 years; Latif, 8 years; Supan al Supandi, 8 
years; Maksum, 8 years; Porto Ali, 1 1 years; Suwadak, 9 
years; Moshud, 9 years; and Moch. Suroyono, 14 years. All 
the accused have been in detention since 26 November-, 
1982. 
12 years for disputing Murdoni's version of Tonjung Priok 
In Surabaya, Ali Masrum (24), a teacher at a religious 
school (modrasoh) hos been given a 12-yeor sentence for 
organising lectures by lecturers from Jakarta on Islomi c 
values, distributing a leaflet entitled, "Chronology of 
Attacks on the Muslim Corrmunity in Tonjung Priok" and 
circulating cassettes of lectures delivered by Amir Biki 
(who was shot dead during the 12 September 1984 Tonjung 
Priok massacre) and Syorifin Moloko just prior to the 
Tonjung Priok demonstration. These activities were 
considered by the court as being aimed at undermining 
government authority and overthrowing the lawful 
Indonesian government. 
Ali Mosrum is a well-known broadcaster on private radio 
in East Java, and his popularity drew large crowds to his 
trial. 
The defence team protested against the Court for 
holding one of the hearings in secret, in order to listen 
to the cassettes containing the two offending lectures. 
Answering the defence complaint that this was in 
violation of the procedural code, the Court declared that 
this hod been done for security reasons. It was the 
Court's opinion that "Amir Biki 's lecture contained on 
attack on the legal Indonesian government and it was not 
fitting for it to be heard by the public." (Merdeka, 9 
September) 
The case against A.M. Fatwa 
Andi Mappetahang Fatwa, a well-known Muslim preacher and political activist, used the occasion of his trial which opened 
in Jakarta in August to explain his views on a range of political, social and religious matters. In a 90-page document 
which he read to a packed court-room and to a large, supportive crowd following the proceedings outside, he also gave 
details of the acts of terror perpetrated against him since the late 1970s and the maltreatment he has suffered since .his 
arrest - in his own words, "my abduction" - on 19 September last year. The following is a short summary with extracts 
from this very important document: 
Abduction and maltreatment in custody 
Fatwa was abducted by troops of the Jakarta Military 
Command while he was undergoing interrogation at a 
Jakarta police station about his Idul Fitri sermon in 
June lost year. The police hod been interrogating him 
three times a week for several weeks "in a relaxed 
atmosphere", creating the impression that they were 
dragging things out as if they were waiting for something 
to happen. 
In their abduction, the troops violated many procedural 
regulations. They dragged him from the police station and 
prevented his lawyer, who hod been attending the police 
interrogations, from accompanying him to the 'hiuch-
feored" Gtmtur Military Police HQ. He found many young 
detainees at Guntur, all of them Priok victims. Most hod 
swollen faces and other signs of maltreatment, heads 
shaven bore, were dressed only in pants and heaped 
together like fish just caught in a net. 
He describes his own treatment in Guntur where he 
remained only one day before being transferred to 
Cimonggis detention centre as follows: 
"During my interrogation on that first day, two 
soldiers armed with long weapons stood guard at the door. 
When interrogations ended that night, these guards took 
me and pushed me with their weapons into a cell at the 
bock, shouting abuse. This first cell was dork but 
reasonably well ventilated. As we went passed Tony 
Ardhie's cell, the guards doused him with several cans of 
water on a cold night. After half on hour, they 
transferred me to a foul-smelling cell in the central 
area, ventilated by only one tiny hole at the top of a 
high wall. The smell of urine was heavy, and I too hod to 
urinate on the floor of the cell. I found a section of 
floor not recently urinated on, where, in this emergency, 
I said my night prayers. 
'Just as I was dozing off, the door was kicked open and 
I was ordered out, in my underwear and with my feet bore, 
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lhe last page from A.M. Fatwa's speech in court 
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to have my head shaven in the yard ... as they kicked, 
punched and poured abuse on me . When I fought the pain by 
praying and repeating holy verses, they shouted at me to 
stop and beat me even harder. After they had had their 
fill, they pushed me back into the cell, but soon after, 
at about 3 am, they dragged me out again." 
Fatwa was then driven blind-folded to Cimanggis by 
troops who added to his torment by making him think that 
he was about to be bumped off like a victim of the death-
squads. 
In Cimanggis, there were a large nurrber of young men 
who were victims of the Tanjung Priok affair. Many were 
severely wounded, with bullet wounds in their thighs and 
stomachs. Some had had a foot or leg (kaki) amputated. 
In Cimanggis military detention centre, the civilian 
detainees incarcerated there for the first seven months 
after the Tanjung Priok incident suffered the following 
restrict ions: 
* No writing implements were allowed. 
* No books were allowed except for the Ku'ran and even 
this was not allowed in for the first two months. 
* Detainees' cell were repeatedly searched purely to 
inflict mental terror, as no 'prohibited goods' could 
possibly have got in because of the many searches. 
* Sport was not allowed at all at first. In the final 
month, a 15-minute sports break was permitted but this 
only happened when "a good guard" was on duty. 
* Friday corrmunal prayers were prohibited. It was not 
till he was moved to Salemba Prison, seven months later, 
that Fatwa could participate in Friday prayers. 
"Medical treatment was appalling, not so much because of 
the lack of facilities but rather because of attitudes, 
behaviour and (lack of) health protection. One young 
Priok victim was not allowed to remove a bandage from a 
The charges 
That he attended "illegal" meetings, one at the home of 
Marine Lieutenant-General (retired) Ali Sadikin on 15 
Septerrber 1985 where a White Paper on the Tanjung Priok 
incident was discussed, and one at his own home three 
days later where plans to carry out bombing attacks and 
wage a campaign of "mental terror" were allegedly 
discussed. 
That he signed the White Poper which, with others, he 
circulated to mosques throughout the capital. 
That he delivered a number of "inflarrmotory" lectures 
accusing the government of being anti-Islam because of 
its campaign to force all social organisations to accept 
the Poncasila as their sole ideology (azos tunggal). 
That he cons pi red with others to bring about the 
downfall of the "lawful" government. These others who are 
to appear as witnesses in his trial and who are soon to 
be tried, accor.ding to the prosecutor in his charge sheet 
against Fatwa, include Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Hartono 
Dharsono, former corrmander of the Siliwangi Division and 
former Secretary-General of ASEAN (his trial opened in 
Septerrber ); Air Vice-Marshall (ret'd) Soey i tno Sukirno, 
former ambassador to Australia; Lt-Gen. Ali Sadikin, 
former corrmonder of the Marine Corps and governor of 
Jakarta; Police General (ret'd) Hoegeng Santoso, former 
Chief of Police; Sjafruddin Prawiranegora, a leading 
Muslim politician and head of the 1948-49 Emergency 
Goverrrnent of the Indonesian Republic in Sumatra; Slamet 
Bratanota, politician and Mines and Energy Minister in 
Suharto's first post-coup government; H.M. Sanusi, a 
leader of Muharrmodiyah and Minister for Small Industries 
in Suharto's first post-coup government; Anwar Horyono, 
former parliamentarian; and Erlangga, a student. 
Fatwa is being charged ore under the 1963 Anti-
Subversion Decree which corr ies a maxiumum penalty of 
death as well as several articles of the Criminal Code. 
serious wound for two days by which time it was already 
putrid. Another victim who had no fewer than 39 wound sf as 
a result of being beaten, was left without tream:ient or 
a month though many of his wounds were discharging puss 
all the' time. A third man whose body became half 
paralysed was left screaming with pain for two days in 
his cell before a doctor was allowed to examine him and 
order him to hospital. A fourth was left screaming with 
terror in his cell for an hour when a snake entered. 
Fatwa, who spent a period of time in dete~ti.on during 
the Sukarno regirre, makes the point that conditions under 
which political prisoners were held then were vastly 
better than under Suharto, despite his claims that 
Indonesia is now living in an "era of law". 
Concocting the case against him 
When Fatwa was abducted from the police station on 19 
September, no arrest warrant was produced in violation of 
legal requirements. Nor was a detention order produced 
for two weeks until 3 October. Fatwa explains that his 
I • I interrogators who were from the Public Prosecutors 
Off ice (Kejaksaan), not from the Army, told him frankly 
that they were "having problems" making an anti-
subversion case "only on the basis of my sermons". But as 
Fatwa leaving court after the first hearing 
the days passed, the military came ·up with the idea of 
making the White Paper the main charge, satisfied that 
this was adequate grounds for a charge-sheet invoking the 
Anti-Subversion Decree. Once the case against him had 
been concocted, a detention order was issued, asserting 
that he had been arrested and was being held under this 
Decree. 
The process of case-creation was further clarified when 
Fatwa met another detainee, Tosri f Tuosikal (recently 
tried for involvement in the BCA bombing incidents last 
October and given a life sentence) ofter he was moved to 
Salemba Prison. ''Tuasikal suddenly began to beg my 
forgiveness without me understanding why ••. He had been 
fotced to make a confession about me, to acknowledge a 
receipt for US$2,000 received from me to purchase bombs. 
•.. I was absolutely amazed and at the same time furious 
to hear about this vicious slander but he tried to calm 
me, showing me bayonet injuries in his chest, and telling 
me how he had been tortured night and day with his hands 
and feet bound." 
Harassment and terror, the lot of a Muslim preacher 
Fatwa provides an account of his own experience of 
harassment since the mid-1970s. The Jakarta military 
16 TAPa.. Bulletin No. 71, September 1985 
authorities first started picking him out for attention 
in 1976 because of his activities as the person in charge 
of the religious prograrrme of the Municipality, under Ali 
Sodikin. The governor ignored several demands for his 
dismissal but his position became more vulnerable ofter 
Ali Sodikin was replaced as governor in 1977. In 1978, he 
was arrested and held for nine months without charge for 
allegedly opposing kebotinan (Javanese mysticism), and 
lost all his posts in various non-official bodies. 
Not long ofter his release from prison, he was sacked 
as a civil servant by Interior Minister, General Amir 
Mochmud because of a sermon he gave on ldul Fitri and re-
arrested, though held this time for only two weeks, 
perhaps because of critical press reporting at the time. 
He never stopped preaching however, and after he signed 
the Petition of Fifty in 1980, the physical and mental 
terror intensified. He made various attempts to initiate 
legal proceedings against senior goverrvnent officials for 
slanderous remarks about· him. 
All efforts to set himself up in business failed 
because licences were refused, while his preaching 
continued to be harassed. Wher:i an invitation to preach at 
on ldul Fitri gathering in 1980 was withdrawn under Army 
pressure and another preacher was "dropped" in his stead, 
troops started firing when disturbances broke out among 
the congregation. He was held for interrogation for 
several days and ultimately released, again because of 
the public outcry. On his way to visit relatives of 
mosque off iciols who hod been arrested because of their 
efforts· to hove him preach, Fatwa was abducted by the 
Army and severely beaten. (His account of what happened 
was published in TAPCL Bulletin, No. 43, January 1981.) 
In 1982, he initiated legal proceedings against the 
soldiers responsible for the incident and against Admiral 
Sudomo, corrrnander of KOA<AMTIB. as their superior. His 
team of lawyers was in turn subjected to terror and 
lntimidot ion and eventually abandoned the case while 
protesting strongly because their professional freedom as 
lawyers had been placed in jeopardy. (See TAPCL Bulletin, 
No. 55, January 1983.) 
Three retired generals, Aziz Saleh, Ali Sadikin and 
Hortono Dhorsono took over his legal defence because they 
felt they would not be likely to be terrorised. The case 
proceeded but was lost. ("It would have been 
inconceivable for KOA<AMTIB to be found guilty," says 
Fatwa.) They appealed to the High Court which declared it 
was unable to hear the case because the documents were 
not considered adequate and returned it to the lower 
court. "It is still therefore open to me," says Fatwa, 
"to pursue the matter." The indefatigable Fatwa also 
declared that he had initiated proceedings against 
General Amir Machmud for unfair dismissal from the civil 
service in 1979. 
In October 1982, an attempt was made on his life when 
thugs sloshed his throat while he was driving in Jakarta. 
He lists the many occasions when sermons he was 
scheduled to deliver were banned by the military ("not 
cancelled by mosque officials, as the indictment 
claims"). 
Fatwa's political position 
The last 30 pages of his statement are given over to a 
exposition of his own political views. He has never 
opposed Pancasila, he says. On the contrary, he regards 
it as a crucial platform, giving all creeds and opinions 
a rightful place in the Republic. He believes that the 
Muslim corrmunity, comprising the vast majority of the 
population, needs to have an assured place in society, 
not forced to conform to Pancosila as the sole ideology. 
He has never supported calls for an Islamic state but 
stresses that Islam does not allow for a false separation 
between politics and state affairs on the one hand, and 
religion on the other. The views he expounds are 
outstanding for their tolerance towards other creeds and 
beliefs; they are completely free of racism and 
impressive for the importance he attaches to all groups 
being allowed to exercise social control under proper 
democratic conditions. 
Corrrnenting on the Tanjung Prick affair, he expresses 
amazement that the many fiery sermons being delivered in 
Priok in the months prior to the affair were never halted 
by the security forces while his "far more moderate 
sermons" were subjected to constant harassment. Without 
saying so, he appears to suspect that the security forces 
allowed tensions to grow, leading ultimately to the 
crackdown on 12 September and the subsequent onslaught 
against Muslim opposition, of which his own trial is an 
important part. 
New bill on the lawcourts 
Lawyers ore very critical of a draft bill on the law 
courts which has been submitted to the DPR (the lower 
legislative assembly) by the government because it will 
reinforce Executive control over the Judiciary. The bill 
places judges under two authorities, the Minister of 
Justice and the Supreme Court, giving the former pre-
eminence. The just ice minister will exercise "guidance" 
(pembinaan) over the organisation, administration and 
powers of the lawcourts, while the Supreme Court will be 
in charge of "technical guidance". The new law confirms 
that judges ore "government officials" (pegawai negeri) 
and therefore bound by government policy. On top of that, 
it gives the judges who preside over the district 
appelate courts (pengadilan tinggi) the power to exercise 
supervision over lawyers wishing to practise in all 
courts of law. 
Lawyers attending a seminar of Peradin, the Bar 
Join KffiPRI, the government-sponsored civil servants' 
associationwhosemembersmay not deviate from government 
policy and ideology, it is not possible for defendants to 
expect a fair trial. 
Lawyers in East Java were the first to experience the 
effects of supervision of their profession by the law 
courts when a Surabaya High Court judge announced earlier 
this year that lawyers working in the province must 
obtain a licence from his court in order to continue with 
their practice. He also decreed ' that these licences ore 
renewable every two years.( See T APCL Bulletin, No 68, 
March 1985, page 6.) Although lawyers protested strongly 
against this encroachment of their independence, the 
draft bill means that the East Java precedent in now to 
apply nationwide. 
Association, were outspoken in their rejection of the ..lJdges' criticisms squashed 
bill which they believe will put an end to what freedoms In fact, misgivings about the projected bill were first 
they still hove. Haryono Tjitrosoebono, chairman of voiced several months ago by the judges association, 
Peradin, criticised the downgrading of the Supreme Court lkahi which argued in a statement that members of their 
which should safeguard the independence of the judiciary. profession would find it difficult to resist (government) 
(The present structure of the Court which is chaired by interference in their determination of verdicts if they 
General Ali Said hos in fact already put on end to such continue to be civil servants. The organisation was 
independence.) quickly forced to retract when General Ali Said publicly 
The status of judges as government officials has long denounced their statement as being "absurd" and 0 
been an issue with lawyers who defend political coses. "rehash" of earlier complaints. (Tempo, 8 June) 
With such a status, which also means that judges must (Source: ~s, 2 Septeni>er and Tempo, 7 Septermer) 
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Muslims on trial 
Islamic educational course on trial 
· d s b E t Java in which the accused are all A series of trials have been under way since June and July in Malang an ura aya, as all d L b 
d d · 1 din a Muslim educational network. c e em aga facing subversion charges because they have atten e or are invo ve . . Ed ti al 
Pendidikan Pondolc. Pesantren Wat. (LPJI<.). Roughly translated, this means Lightening-Course Pesantren uca on 
Institute, pesantren being the name of Islamic religious boarding-schools. 
Accusot ions made against the defendants in the 
indictments S{Jggest that the LP3K was first launched in 
1982 in Bandung and hos since established branches in 
many cities throughout Java, attracting a large number of 
participants. The trials under way are attended by large 
crowds of people, mostly young men and women who make no 
secret of their support for the men on trial. Most of the 
women wear head-scarves. The court-rooms are reported to 
be under heavy guard, with metal-detectors and other 
surveillance devices helping to create an atmosphere of 
tension. 
From the names of people, presumably also under arrest, 
being mentioned in the current trials, the Molong and 
Surabaya trials ore likely to be followed by others in 
Bandung and possibly also Jakarta. 
The trials appear to be aimed at establishing a link 
between this educational network and a series of bombings 
in East and Central Java - the attack on' a seminary in 
Malang on Christmas Eve last year, the explosions which 
seriously damaged nine stupas at the Borobudur Buddhist 
monument in Central Java on 21 January this year and an 
explosion on a bus near Banyuwongi, East Java on 16 Morch 
which killed seven passengers and injured many others. 
The prosecution also appears to be bent on proving that 
the men guiding and directing the LP3K were using it as a 
training ground for cadres committed to the creation of 
an Islamic state in Indonesia. The men named in this 
connection are Mursolim Dohlon, a Muslim preacher from 
Jakarta, who is now under arrest and whose trial could 
come as the climax to the regime's campaign against the 
LP](, and Ir M. Sonusi, formerly a leading member of the 
Muslim social organisation, Muhammadiyoh and now member 
of the Petition-of-50 group who was tried and sentenced 
to 19 years in Moy for allegedly funding the bomb 
explosions which damaged the offices of Bonk Central Asia 
lost October. (See TAPOLBulletin, 69, Moy 1985, p. 9-10) 
The defendants 
The men on trial for subversion in Molong are Andi 
Sukisno (21 ), a student at the Malong Institute of 
Educot ion (IKIP), Murdjoko (26) who works for the 
Browijaya State University in Malang, Faisal Fochri (21), 
a student at the polytechnic attached to Brawijaya 
University in Malang and Sugeng Budiono (20) a student of 
statistics at the Open University. Others who ore due for 
trial according to the public affairs office of the 
Molong District Court ore Ir 'FW', recently graduated 
from Molong University, Moch. Achwan, chairman of the 
Malang branch of the LP]( and 'AKAH' (37) who is 
described as the person caught in connection with the bus 
explosion; 
On trial in Surabaya are Si111>uong Abdul Malik a 
preacher and chairman of the Surabaya branch of LP3K and 
Andri Horto, a student at Universitas Muhcmadiyah 
Surabaya and chairman of the Al-Faloq Mosque Youth also 
in Surabaya. who had taken an LP]( course in Malang and 
was then put in charge of spiritual affairs for the LP3K 
network in Surabaya. The Andri Horta trial is also 
referred to as ah 'i Ile gal leaflets subversion' trial 
because the accused allegedly distributed leaflets 
disputing General Murdani 's account of what happened in 
Tanjung Priak last September, but primarily the hearings 
appear to deal with LPl<'s educational activities. 
Press reports ore typically brief and reveal little 
Murdjoko in court 
about the case being put by the defence. The Golkor 
Jakarta doily, Suora Korya devotes more attention than 
other papers to these trials, charged apparently to ~elp 
the regime build up an image of a dangerous, Muslim-
inspired conspiracy threatening Indonesia's 'Pancosilo 
democracy'. (Our access to Suaro Korya reporting is based 
on Indonesia Reports logging of the Indonesian press.) 
Defence witnesses not produced 
An example of the severe constraints faced by the 
defence is their failure to secure the presence of the 
more senior figures in the LP]( movement in the witness 
box. It is the duty of the prose cut ion to produce 
witnesses, but witnesses coiled by the defence, including 
Mursalim Dahlan, were not produced. At a hearing of the 
Murjako trial on 19 August, the prosecution presented the 
Investigation Reports (SAP) of four 'witnesses' including 
Mursolim Dohlan, claiming that they could not be present 
in person. (Sinor Horapon, 20 August) All were identified 
only by their initials, implying that they are all under 
arrest and awaiting trial. Despite the defendant's 
rejection of this testimony from men most of whom he said 
he did not even know, the judges decided to accept these 
Investigation Reports as formal evidence. 
Retired general on trial 
The trial of Lieutenant (retired) H.R Dharsono, 
formerly corrmander of the Siliwongi Division, has opened 
in Jakarta. In his indictment, the prosecutor mentioned 
nine members of the Petition-of-50 group as well, 
implying that they are also to be tried. They are: Major-
General (ret'd) Azis Saleh, former Minister of Health; 
Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Ali Sadikin, former Governor 
of Jakarta; Major-General (ret'd) Suyitno Sukirno, a 
former ambassador; former Chief of Police, Hoegeng I. 
Santoso; Syofruddin Prawiranegara; former ministers 
Burhanuddin Horahap, Slomet Brotonata and H.M. Sonusi 
(serving a 19-yeor sentence); Anwar Haryono, a lawyer. 
A full report of Dharsono's trial and other related 
trials will appear in the next Bulletin. 
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Another Musi im paper banned 
Al-lkhwon, an Islamic newspaper published in Jogjakarta, 
hos been banned by order of the Attorney-General. The ban 
dated 28 May was not made public until 2 July. The 
announcement was made together with an announcement that 
the paper's editor, lrfon Suryohordi (24) is under arrest 
and is shortly to be tried. Other members of the paper's 
staff ore also believed to be under arrest. 
Irfan is in the final year of high-school. The 
newspaper is accused of having caused public disorder and 
unrest by its attacks on Poncosilo, the notional State 
leadership and various government prograrrmes such as 
family planning. Irfan's trial will apparently take place 
in Jogjakarta, with more than 30 witnesses due to be 
coiled by the prosecution, of whom at least ten are 
professors and lee turer-s at Ga ja Mada University, 
Jogjakarta who were naned as advisors and sponsors of the 
publication. 
Al-llicwon (The Brotherhood) is the successor to Ar-
Risoloh which was banned in October 1983. The Attorney-
Generol announced that the paper was being banned along 
with oil other material produced by Bodon K.omunikosi 
Pemudo Mosjid (Mosque Youth Corrmunicotions Body) in 
Siemon, Jogjakarta. According to press reports, Al-llicwon 
was printed monthly with a minimum run of 10,000 copies, 
circulating in Jokor ta, Bandung, Jogjakarta, Solo and 
Surabaya. 
'Suara Mujohidin' is launched 
The enforced demise of Al lkhwan does not appear to be 
the end of the matter. A new publication, Suara 
Mujahidin, with a format and style close to that of the 
banned paper, came out with its first edition in May 
1985. Published by the Department of Information of 
Joma'ah Mujahidin Indonesia {Indonesian Mujahidin 
Corrmunity), the first edition - a copy of which has been 
obtained by TAPOL - is a 12-page tabloid with articles 
attacking the 'kejowen' (Javanese mystics) philosophy 
being pr011oted by the Suharto military regime, a stinging 
condemnation of the government's family planning 
prograrrme, a brief critical analysis of the current re-
organisation of the Armed Forces and a lengthy report of 
interviews with two Muslim activists who managed to go 
into hiding while appeals regarding their cases were 
still under consideration. 
Admiral Sudomo, Minister of Labour, talking to workers. 
Human rights violations 
Workers dismissed for defending 
their rights 
The Minister of Labour, Acrniral {ret'd) Sudomo has 
dismissed nearly 800 workers who were employed by the 
United Con Company, accusing them of 'anarchic' 
behaviour. Making public his decision, he acknowledged 
that this was the first time in the history of the Labour 
Deportment for a minister to order dismissals. The 
decision had been taken, he said, "to prevent the spread 
of anarchy which could influence workers in all parts of 
the country." (Teft1>0, 31 August) 
Prior to his appointment as Minister of Labour in March 
1983, Sudomo was corrmander of the military regime's 
security agency, KOPKAMTIB (Operational Corrmand for the 
Restoration of Security and Order), and he frequently 
alludes to his preference from strong- arm tactics and his 
KOA<AMTIB past in his dealings with the workers. Since 
his appointment, the militarisation of the Department has 
been stepped up. The Secretary-General is General Sutopo 
Yuwono, an intelligence officer who headed BAKIN, the 
intelligence co-ordination agency, for many years. 
A labour dispute has been raging at the United Can 
Company, a joint Indonesian-Japanese enterprise located 
in T angerang, West Java, s i nee late lost year. The 
workers, who are organised in the Union of Metal and 
Cer011ic Workers - a member of the FBSI which is the only 
trade union federation allowed to exist - submitted a 
demand in December last year for the employers to bring 
the basis for colculatiing overtime payments into line 
with a ministerial decision issued in 1984. When the 
company failed to do this and threatened to take action 
against the workers, 800 workers held a protest IT)eeting 
and called for the dismissal of the personnel officer. 
This led to the dismissal of eleven workers which in 
turn led to a second demonstration calling for the re-
instatement of the dismissed men. During the course of 
this demonstration which continued late into the night, 
some management staff were unable to gain access to their 
cars, which led to a charge, widely reported in the 
press, that the workers had held 19 management personnel 
hostage. The workers vehemently deny this and say that 
this distortion of events is largely responsible for 
their shabby treatment ever since. 
The eleven dismissed men were then interrogated by the 
local military corrmand, and their dismissal was later 
upheld by the central arbitration board (P4P), whereupon 
the workers held their third demonstration, again calling 
for the reinstatement of the men. This was the 'anarchic 
behaviour' which resulted inSudomo's dismissal order. 
LBH protest 
Abdul l-lakim G. Nusantara, Director of the Jakarta Legal 
Aid Institute has issued a statement condemning the 
minister's decision as a violation of the country's 
labour laws and a contradiction of Sudomo's own 
declaration less than a year ago that companies should 
avoid dismissing their workers, however hard the economic 
recession might hit them. Abdul Hakim also warned that 
those who have been victimised in this way are perfectly 
within their rights to sue the minister. 
Bandung students protest at suspensions 
Thirty-five students at the Bandung Institute of 
Technology (ITB) hove been suspended indefinitely for 
toking part in activities involving inhabitants in 
kompungs around the ITB campus. They had planned to hold 
a cultural evening and discussions about current affairs. 
Minister of Education, Foud Hassan during a visit to 
Bandung but failed ·because they had "not used the proper 
procedures". The next day, many students demonstrated 
with banners and posters but were ordered to disband. 
These activities were prepared as port of a 'study Student Defence Cornnittee active 
orientation' prograrrme for new students, but ITB A document of 7 August issued by the ITB Student 
authorities refused to allow this on the grounds that all DefenceCorrmitteewhichhosjustbeenreceivedbyTAPOL, 
'university initiation progr011mes' (perploncoon) a r e criticises the huge funding and corruption surrounding 
illegal, on as well as off canpus. (KOlllJOs, 31 August) the recent Indonesian Film Festival in Bandung. It calls 
Following repeated efforts to raise their grievances for a more socially-oriented film industry and for more 
with the Rector, a group of students tried to meet the attention to be paid to the needs of tht! urban poor. 
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East Timor 
East Timor remains an 
international issue 
Although the UN General Assembly has again decided this year not to discuss a resolution on East Timar following a report 
by the Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar that bilateral consultations between Portugal and Indonesia are still in 
progress, the issue of self-determination for East Timar has been more heatedly debated in the past few months than for 
many years. 
Diplomatic row between Australia and Portugal 
Bob Hawke, the Australian Prime Minister raised a storm 
of protest at home and abroad with a shameless remark on 
Indonesian television on 16 August and later reiterated 
in Parliament that Australia "recognises the sovereign 
authority of Indonesia over East Timor" and regards the 
East Timorese as "citizens of Indonesia". 
While the Indonesian press welcomed Hawke's statement, 
with the ..Jm<orto Post (22 August} cynically hoping that 
the whole affair could now be "buried in the dustbin of 
history", many groups in Australia voiced their anger. As 
Peter Robertson of the Australian Friends of East Timor 
put it, "Australia is risking condemnation and disgrace 
from her Pacific neighbours and many Third World 
countries. (Sunday Independent, 25 August) 
The Australian Labour government did not however reckon 
with the strong protest that greeted Hawke's statements 
in Lisbon. Two protest notes were sent to Canberra, one 
from President Eanes and one from the Portuguese 
government. Jill Jolliffe, writing in The Age, (4 
September} described this as "the strongest and most 
dranatic stand Lisbon has taken since the Indonesian 
invasion". The Australian arrbassador in Lisbon was given 
a stiff reprimand by the Foreign Ministry and the 
Portuguese ambassador in Canberra was recalled "for 
consultations", a severe step to take in diplomatic 
relations. 
Hawke's statement at first appeared to be little more 
than a reiteration of the Australian Liberal government's 
Jonuary 1978 de jure recognition of Indonesia's 
'integrasi' of East Timor. It was however the first 
categorical statement by the Labour government and 
moreover was apparently needed in order to clear the way 
for all-out exploration and exploitation by Australia-
bosed capital of the rich oil deposits lying between 
Australia's northern reaches and the south coast of 
Timor. In the first week of September, the Australian 
Bond Corporation announced new investments of $233 
million to open up 32 wells in four new areas located in 
the 'Timor Gap'. 
On 19 September, the Portuguese government again 
protested to Canberra, this time about plans for joint 
Indonesian-Australian exploration of oil resources in the 
Timor Sea, port of the territory "over which Portugal is 
the internationally-recognised administering power". The 
note condemns Australia's "clear disrespect for internal 
laws" at a time when East Timor is still listed by the UN 
as a non-self-governing territory whose people have not 
been able to exercise the right of self-determination. 
Hawke's shameless gesture may also have been prompted 
by his need to 'ease' relations with Jakarta at a time 
when they have been 'clouded' by such issues as the five 
Papuan refugees now residing in Thursday Island, and the 
recently-established radio link with Fretilin forces 
which continues to operate despite a ban imposed by the 
Australian government. 
Indonesia's official reaction was somewhat less than 
jubilant for Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja was 
quick to point out that Canberra has not gone far enough 
because it has not yet positively acknowledged that an 
'act of self-determination' occurred in Dili on 31 May 
1976, legitimising 'integrasi'. 
l.1'-1 'consultations' leading nowhere 
Portugal's new firmness on East Timor should be seen in 
the context of the 'consultations' which have reportedly 
been toking place under UN auspices following the General 
Assembly 1982 resolution which instructed the Secretory-
AOOUf t:ASC '{IMO~ -
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General to initiate consultations between the parties 
"directly concerned". (Oddly enough, the East Timor 
people have never been included under this definition.) 
Early in September, Mochtar commented on the 
consultations and reiterated that self-determination was 
not to be discussed and that consultations with Portugal 
would only touch on peripheral matters. Thus, Portugal 
has been mode well aware that not even a face-saving 
formula is possible, enabling it to appear to be 
fulfilling its constitutional obligation to bring about a 
process of de-colonisation through on act of self-
determination in East Timor. 
Although East Timor has never become an election issue 
in Portugal, President Eanes who will be quitting the 
presidency following elections in a few months time has 
always attached importance to Portugal's obligations and 
has often reprimanded the Socialist government for its 
negligence. 
Jaime Gana: "Self-detenninotion is the core of the 
question" 
There is reason to believe that Jaime Gama, Portugal's 
Foreign Minister, hos moved closer to the President's 
position, recognising that a stolement hos been reached 
with Indonesia at the UN. Jaime Gama took the unusual 
step of urging the former Portuguese colon{es in Africa 
to support East Timor at the Non-Aligned Foreign 
Ministers conference in Luanda at the beginning of 
September and went to the Angolan capital to attend the 
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conference himself. Speaking at the UN General Assembly 
on 23 September, he stressed, in relation to Portugal's 
bilateral talks with Indonesia, that self-determination 
for East Timor "is the core of the quest ion". He also 
said that respect for human rights in East Timor is 
gtill far from meeting our expectations". (AP, 23 
Septeni>er) 
Another sign of shifting attitudes among Socialist 
Party politicians who hope to win both the forthcoming 
parliamentary and presidential elections cCl'Tle with a 
statement by Minister of State, Antonio Almedia Santos, 
the party's candidate for prime minister. In an interview 
on 31 August in Faro, he said: "Portugal has a moral 
obligation which it cannot decline and it will continue 
to be faithful to this and work within the bounds of 
possibility so that self-determination for the people of 
East Timor can be achieved."(~arta Post, 2 September) 
Prime Minister Soares' meeting with Mgr Belo, Apostolic 
Administrator of Dili (see separate item) may have also 
contributed to reversing his earlier feeble attitude 
towards East Timor. 
Portugal md<es fo(1Tl(Jl contact with Fretilin 
On 24 September, the Portuguese Foreign Minister held a 
formal rreeting in New York with Fretilin's representative 
to the UN, Jose Ramos 1-iorta. This is the first time such 
formal contact has been made and could mark a new 
departure in the negotiations currently taking place 
between Portugal and Indonesia under UN auspices 
regarding the future of East Timor, which have until now 
excluded East Timorese participation. 
East Timor ruins Indonesia's bid to host 1986 Non-Aligned Surrmit 
An even more damaging dent in Indonesia's battered 
image was i.nflicted at the September conference of 
foreign ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement held in 
Luanda, the capital of a country that has consistently 
supported East Timor against Indonesia. 
The first blow came when, for the first time in the 
history of the Non-Aligned Movement, a Fretilin 
delegation was invited to attend the opening session 
along with other liberation movements, resulting in a 
furious row with the Indonesian delegation. The draft 
political declaration circulated in advance of the 
meeting by the Angolan government as the host, included a 
three-paragraph statement on East Timor calling among 
other things for East Timorese participation in the UN 
consultations. 
On his departure for Luanda, flanked by a huge 
delegation of senior officials, Foreign Minister Mochtar 
declared that "the main task of the Indonesian delegation 
this time is to eliminate the East Timor question from 
the draft declaration". (Kompos, 30 August) But Moch tar 
had another 'main task' which was to push through a 
decision that Indonesia would host next year's Non-
Aligned Surrmit and chair the movement till 1989. The 
controversy over East Timor proved to be the stumbling-
block to this ambition. 
Indonesia has made no secret of its desire to host the 
1986 Non-Aligned Movement conference. The idea was first 
mooted by the Malaysian Prime Minister dl'ling a visit to 
.Jakarta last year, and as the Luando meeting drew near, 
the idea was more and more enthusiastically promoted by 
Foreign Department spokesmen. 
A few weeks before the meeting, Mochtar announced at 
his weekly press conference that "Indonesia is prP.pared 
to host the 1986 sur1T11i t conference of the Non-Aligned 
Movement if requested ot next month's meeting". (Jakarta 
Post, 12 August) A few weeks later however, he was forced 
to admit that this was unlikely to happen as one 
criterion is that the host government is not in conflict 
with another member of the bloc. Even so, he could not 
abandon the idea because Suharto himself was determined 
to become the Movement's chairman (maybe he thinks he 
isn't likely to get another chance!) and, as every 
government minister iii Indonesia knows, . Suharto's wishes 
are paramount. This was to have been the crowning glory 
of Indonesia's recent posturing as a 'major world power'. 
Indeed, it was recently acknowledged that the elaborate 
gathering held to mark the 30th anniversary of the 
Bandung Conference last April was intended primarily as a 
'dress rehearsal' for the l 986 Non-Aligned Surrmi t. 
On his arrival at Luanda airport, Mochtar again 
announced that Indonesia was seeking the chairmanship, 
and while the conference was in progress, back horre in 
Jakarta, Gennal Amir Machmud, chairman of Indonesia's 
legislative assembly, announced after an audience with 
Suharto that Indonesia "should agree (sic) to host the 
coming Non-Bloc surrmi t conference" (Kon-pas, 6 September) 
Unfort•Jnately for Suharto however, things were not going 
Mochtar's way in Luanda. 
East Timor proved to be the most hotly debCJted issue in 
Luanda, rrore controversial even than the debate over the 
Iran-Iraq conflict. "Fretilin,11 writes Jill Joliffe (For 
Eastern Economic Revie~ 19 September) "was principally 
supported by the five Poe tuguese-speaking Afr icon 
countries, Vietnam, Laos and Vanuatu. What they lacked in 
numbers they made up foe in corrmitment: the fight to keep 
the reference in (the dcaft declnrotion) resulted in the 
most heated debate of the conference." 
Indonesia lobbied hard and argued primarily on formal 
grounds, thal East Timor had been deleted from the 1983 
Political Declaration at the Non-Bloc Surrmit in Delhi and 
could not be restored. When a vote was td<:en, Indonesia 
mustered a majority, but this did not result in the issue 
being dropped. Policy decisions by the Non-Aligned 
Movement con only be taken by consensus, with the result 
that the three-paragraph reference was kept in the 
Political Declaration with a note that consensus was not 
reached. And Zimbabwe was chosen as next year's host. 
Indonesia's cherished ambition to host the 1986 surrmit 
conference was shattered by an issue it has tried for so 
long to consign to "the dustbin o·f history". And to ram 
home the defeat, it hos now been announced (For Eastern 
EconomicRevie~ 26 September) that the question of East 
Timor has been included on the agenda of the 1986 surrmit. 
Fretilin's message to the Luanda conference 
A message to the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers conference 
which was held in Luanda, from Xanana, chairman of the 
Revolution Council of Notional Resistance was transmitted 
by radio to Darwin on 1 September, in time for delivery 
at the conference which opened on 4 September. 
After welcoming the Non-Aligned Movement's principles 
of non-violence and stressing the need for dialogue to 
resolve conflicts, Xanana gave a brief history of East 
Timer's 10-year struggle against Indonesian aggression. 
Turning to the present situation, he says: 
The vile and barbarous aggressor continues to massacre 
and torture the population with impunitlj, persecuting and 
threatening (people) with death, searching houses and 
people, prohibiting travel and demanding travel passes 
and controlling even the smallest concentration camps, 
with lower rank troops in each camp and higher rank 
troops in each village. Even so, the population is forced 
to provide securitlj at night for the cowardllJ occupiers. 
Each dalJ, ever1Jone - from the elderllJ to the children -
is forced to do so, with threats of reprisals for each 
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Fretilin attack. Such reprisals occurred in Iliomar last 
January when over 40 civilians were shot by the 
occupiers, and last Hay in Viqueque where the enemy 
position inside the camp killed over 50 civilians with 
mortars and grenades concentrated near a building. 
This is the constant threat hanging over the East 
Timorese population, the real face of military control by 
the occupation forces. The herded pop.ulation, unable to 
survive without crops, tries to escape the vigilance and 
control of the enemy in order to scavenge for food in the 
bush, facing the risk. of being caught by patrols and 
massacred on suspicion of being in contact with Fretilin. 
On the misuse of relief aid from abroad, he says: 
The resources of UN ES C 0 are being used to serve 
Indonesian policy. The women whose husbands were 
massacred by the Indonesians and who agree not to work 
for the resistance and to spy for the Indonesians are the 
ones who receive the food, tins of condensed milk and 
rotten corn. 
The 1 iberat ion movement is very bitter about the 
favourable reports produced by government delegations 
that have visited East Timor under Indonesian auspices: 
Several governments who use the rhetoric of human 
rights are in fact accomplices in the crimes committed in 
East Timar. Indonesia has spread false propaganda, 
claiming absolute control of East Timar, seeking thereby 
to guarantee total impunity for its policy of genocide 
and occupation carried out in our homeland. Several 
delegations manipulated by Jakarta have given false 
testimony about the real situation in East Timar. Tanks 
and assault vehicles are hidden outside the towns, war 
materials are stored (a way) and the occupation troops 
wear civilian clothes while a few pri vileged Timorese are 
made to perform for rupiahs to impress the visitors. 
Prisoners are transferred to other locations and strong 
security placed around the towns, The population is 
threatened and told not to speak, and security prevents 
them approaching the visitors. These are different 
aspects of a farce repeatedly used by the murderous 
occupiers of our homeland. In fact, when foreign visitors 
ask. (questions) about massacres, they are asking the 
torturers and the puppet governor. 
Fretilin is particularly angry about the Australian 
goverrment's stand, warning that Hawke's statemen~ ~f 16 
August will encourage Jakarta to intensify military 
operations against the population. This political a~d 
diplomatic support will encourage the military to c~rrrn1t 
even more atrocities against a defenceless population: 
Recentl.y, the Australian government pronounced an 
irresponsible and unscrupulous policy, recognising the 
military control and brutal repression of our people as 
supposed Indonesian sovereignty over East Timar, with the 
intention of facilitating negotiations with Jakarta about 
exploration for deposits of oil and natural gas in our 
southern sea. We totally repudiate the idea that 
humanitarian concern motivates the Australian government 
in this dirty political manoeuvre to cover up economic 
interests. In the concrete case of the Ti mar Gap, the 
rights of the East Timorese people have been usurped in 
this operation. 
The message makes a strong appeal to the Non-Aligned 
Movement to condemn Indonesian aggression and makes the 
following proposals: 
1) Ta allow entry of independent observers to study the 
real situation in East Ti mar. 
2) To allow entry of humanitarian organisations to give 
direct assistance to the needy population with clothing 
and medicine. 
J) To consider the proposals for a solution put forward 
by Fretilin. 
The message in conclusion recalls the original spirit 
of the Non-Aligned Movement, putting emphasis on its 
anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle: 
Due to the character of the Non-Aligned Movement, the 
just struggle of this small and defenceless Haubere 
people is an integral part of the liberation struggles of 
peoples of the Third World against imperialism and 
colonialism and against the expansionist ambitions of the 
big nations who wish to subjugate by force small and 
frail peoples. We are confident that you will give due 
consideration to the sufferings of the oppressed people 
of East Tim or who for ten years have resisted Indonesia's 
genocidal war of occupation. 
Catholic Church's concern for East Timor grows 
The low-profile visit of t-igr Carlos Ximenes Belo, 
Apostolic Administrator of Dili, to the Vatican in June 
this year led to speculations that he may be seeking 
asylum abroad. Only since his return have the facts about 
the activities of the leader of the East Timer Church 
while abroad become public. 
Mgr Belo's efforts to seek a just solution for East 
Timor were revealed in an interview with Jacques Guillon, 
AFP correspondent in Jakarta, just before returning to 
Dili. He told AFP he had gone abroad "to try to launch 
new negotiations between Fretilin and Indonesia". When he 
met the Pope on 5 July, the Pope told him "to work for 
the Church, to fight the suffering of the people and to 
seek for o right solution for peace in Timer." He quoted 
the Pope as saying: "Now, Timer represents the most 
difficult problem in the world." 
It is very difficult to know the real facts "because 
there is no free information in Timor". Regarding recent 
visits of journalists and diplomats to East Timor, he 
said that their reports were of little significance. 
''Even if these people are independent, they cannot say 
the truth because they are too closely guarded to see the 
truth." He only wished visitors could see more than the 
Indonesian military wanted them to see, that "they will 
be able to go into the villages and discuss freely with 
the population and not always with the governor, the 
military chief and the bishop (ie. himself}". 
He also explained how carefully he had to manoeuvre. It 
had taken him 7 months to obtain clearance from the 
military to go abroad. This was why he kept a low profile 
while abroad: "I didn't want to speak with journalists in 
Rome because I know I could have difficulties getting 
back to Dili." 
( AFP report, B August telex from Hongkong} 
Mgr Belo meets Portuguese leaders 
Mgr Belo also made a brief, unannounced visit to Lisbon 
and while there sought appointments with President Eanes 
and Prime Minister Soares. Fearing that he was being 
followed by Indonesian secret agents, he met the Prime 
Minister and the President's personal aide at the 
Vatican's diplomatic mission where he had sought 
diplomatic protection. 
He informed them of the serious situation and the 
continued fighting, proven by (Indonesian) graves 
regularly filling up in Dili cemetery. He hihiself had 
officiated at a series of burials of lndonesiali Catholic 
officers. When asked by Prime Minister Soare~ about the 
comnmist nature of Fretilin, Mgr Belo who is known not 
to be sympathetic towards Fretilin, dismissed the claim 
as nons~nsical. He said they were pure nationalists. 
(Jill Jolliffe in The Age, 4 September) 
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PNG ready to give homes to 
refugees? 
At last, the West Papuan refugee problem in Papua N.ew 
Guinea appears to be moving towards a constructive 
solution. In a press statement on 17 September, Prime 
Minister Michael Somare said his government would 
sympathetically consider resettlement in ~NG for. th~se 
refugees not willing to return home, whale con ti nu mg 
discussions with Jakarta on the repatriation of those 
wishing to return. 
Reuters reports him as adding that he would not allow 
OPM activities on PNG territory, saying: "For those who 
feel they want to make Papua New Guinea not a haven f~r 
illegal activities but who want to make PNG their 
country of course this would be considered on their 
merits.': (Jc'<orto Post, 17 September) It remains to be 
seen whether this will modify Somare's shift towards a 
more welcoming policy towards the refugees. 
Although Prime Minister Somare's statement s~~s lik~ a 
move in the right direction, the enormous d1ff 1culties 
still lying ahead should not be underestimated. PNG is 
currently facing an economic crisis and a budgetary 
deficit of major proportions. (PNG Times, 8 September) 
Its main source of revenue, mineral exports, has fallen 
dramatically because of low pr ices on the world market. 
The country's dependence on Australia is far from 
healthy. Most analysts stress that Australia is propping 
up the PNG economy with $300 million annually in aid but 
the balance of trade between the two countries is almost 
four to one in Australia's favour, producing huge profits 
for the latter's economy, which means that the propping 
up goes the other way round, a classical neo-colonial 
relationship. 
As far as PNG's relations with Indonesia is concerned, 
Australia has shown a total lack of policy on the border 
issue. Recently, the influential Australian Financial 
Review commented that it was about time Australia 
formulated a clear policy on the PNG- Indonesian border 
region. There is "an increasingly glaring weakness in 
Australian foreign policy", the paper wrote, adding that 
Foreign Minister Bill Hayden has "created a real paradox 
is his pursuit of a sensible contemporary Australian 
regional foreign policy by pursuing a strong line on 
Vietnam, yet keeping totally aloof in policy terms from 
the Irion Jaya-PNG refugee problem". (Quoted in Pacific 
Islands Monthly, September 1985) 
Australia's 'velvet glove' policy towards the generals' 
regime and its invisibility on the refugees raises 
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German and American bishops spedc out 
In July, a German bishop for the first time spoke out 
in strong terms about the human rights situation in East 
Timor. Tbe chairman of the German branch of Justitio et 
Po~ Bishop Frans Komphous made a strong plea for 
solidarity with the suffering East Timorese people and 
for pressure on the Indonesian government to put an end 
to the war. (Press release, Bistum Lirri>urg, 9 July) 
In September, John Cardinal O'Connor, Archbishop of New 
York, sent a message of support to the Catholics of East 
Timor "in your struggle to preserve and enhanc.e t~e 
dignity of life and the right of your people to live in 
peace and freedom." 
West Papuon refugees in PNG. 
serious doubts whether Canberra will be willing to 
support Somare's intentions to give the 11,000 refugees a 
new home. 
More refugees cross the border 
In the meantime, Indonesian military operations in the 
interior of West Papua have caused yet more villagers to 
flee towards the border. The BBC reported on 2 September 
that some 500 had arrived at Yapsiei in PNG's West Sepik 
province where they have built themselves temporary 
camps. 
The Bishop of Vanimo, Father John Etheridge, who is 
closely connected with the welfare of refugees recently 
warned that prolonged camp life is causing tensions. 
'From what I can see, there is quite a bit of frustration 
building up in the camps. There is bound to be tension 
when people are stuck in one little spot and they don't 
know whether they are going to be allowed to stay or 
forced bock to Irion Jayo." ( 1he Australian, 4 September) 
Background to the military operations in Ponioi 
In TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, .Nly 1985, we reported the 
heavy loss of life in villages in the Paniai highlands as 
a result of Indonesian military operations. A report 
dated 26 July from Markos Victoria, headquarters of the 
OPM, provides some background information. It states that 
early in April this year, a serious clash occurred 
between Indonesian troops and OPM guerrillas during which 
the Indonesians lost 30 dead, three seriously injured and 
seven slightly injured. 
In retaliation, a large reinforcement of troops was 
dispatched to the area to carry out operations against 
the defenceless inhabitants of various villages. During 
the course of one month, from 4 June till 6 July, 517 
villagers were killed. The new military conrnander of the 
province, Major General Hasudungan Simanjuntak, hos 
declared the whole region to be "rowan" (disturbed). 
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The Port Vila unity declaration 
A long-awaited move towards unification between the two 
wings of the OPM hos now token place with the signing in 
Port Vila, the copi tol of Vanuatu, of a declaration on 11 
July between the two OPM leaders in exile, Seth Rurrkorem 
and Jacob Proi. After nine years of discord and acrimony, 
they formally declared a truce and undertook to work 
together. 
Last November, the first moves towards unification 
occurred with an agreement (a copy of which was only 
recently received) signed between the two wings inside 
West Papua, with M. Prowar representing Markos Victoria, 
the Rumkorem headquarters, and Fisor Jorisetow 
representing Markos Perrka, the Proi headquarters. 
The Port Vila declaration contains a pledge to 
The tragic fate of two who returned 
A report from Vonimo doted 28 July gives on account of 
the 50 refugees who returned to Vanimo on 10 June. The 
group who hod left their villages 17 months ago hod been 
living in Blackwora camp, Vonimo and decided to go home 
after a statement by the Indonesian government assuring 
them of their safety and proper living conditions. 
For the first few days ofter arriving back, they were 
treated generously by the authorities, given all kinds of 
assurances and transport money for the journey home. But 
as the days wore on, a shadow. of fear fell on them as 
more and more frequently, they were visited by 
intelligence agents asking questions and making threats. 
Two of them, Marcus lnggibal Tabuni and Warta Jikwa, 
both from Womeno in the Joyowijoyo district were detained 
without charge, and were subjected to torture and extreme 
mental pressure. 
The same report also refers to the fate of the four OPM 
guerrillas who were deported to Indonesia on 22 June. 
(See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 70, July 1985) All hove been 
placed in military custody. Nabot Wal'Yl'lCI, formerly a 
corporal in the Indonesian Army who defected on 11 
February 1984 is at present detained in the notorious Dok 
V, an underground prison in Jayapura where detainees are 
subjected to extreme physical and mental torture. The 
other three, Ones Sorontouw, lsack Waromi and Ibrahim 
t-bnong are detained in the Police subdistrict prison in 
Jayapura and are not being allowed to receive visitors. 
Seth Rurrkorem (right) 
and Jacob Prai (left) 
with Barak Sope of the 
Vanuatu Governnent, in 
the middle, after the 
unity declaration was 
signed, on 11 July 1985. 
safeguard the "survival right of the Melanesian race in 
West Papua". Both leaders admit that due to their 
disagreements, many casualties had fallen and the 
Indonesian military hod been the ones to benefit. If 
disunity continues, they said, the result will be "the 
obli terot ion of the Melanesian race in West Papua". 
Various plans were mentioned, and it is envisaged that 
a new name will be agreed upon for the reunified national 
liberation movement. Agreement was reached on a division 
of responsibilities, with Jacob Prai taking charge of the 
political side of the movement and Seth Rumkorem in 
charge of military activities. At a future meeting the 
date of which is not yet fixed, and new structure and 
constitution will be discussed. 
Resettling 'isolated' c01T1T1Unities encounters resistance 
A brief news . item in Kompas (27 August) quotes A. 
Sukanto, the district chief of Fakfak in Irion Joya (West 
Papua) as complaining that the programne to resettle 
'isolated' comnunities in government-designated villages 
is not going according to plan. While claiming that the 
programme is "in response to the wishes of the people", 
he contradicts himself by adding that "there still are 
people who want to remain in their places of origin". 
The trouble with refusal to comply with the progranme, 
says Sukanto, is that it hinders the work of officials in 
charge of "giving guidance" because they cannot reach the 
remote places where 'isolated people' live. 
In a cautiously critical article, Kobar dari KompunG 
the publication of the Irion Joya Comnunity Development 
Foundation (3-4/Vol. I, 1985) says three government 
departments are involved in the programne: the Interior 
Ministry which wants to establish "growth centres", the 
Forestry Department which wants to remove people from 
comnercial forestry areas, and the Social Affairs 
Ministry whose aim is to "improve the ideological, 
economic and socio-cultural welfare of those people and 
to improve the security situation". 
Timika, a Fakfak district targetted for resettlement of 
'isolated people' is a region of much social discontent, 
writes Kd<. It agrees on the need to help indigenous 
people, but the plan to turn Timika into a transmigration 
site for 40,000 people "may develop the physical area but 
not the indigenous people". 
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The reorganisation of the Indonesian armed forces 
Part III 
The Novy and the Air Force 
Four years after Suharto seized power, the Indonesian 
Armed Forces (ABRI) underwent a major re-organisation 
which was carried out fran October 1969 to April 1970. 
The primary objective of the Army leaders then was to 
destroy the independence of the Navy and Air Force chiefs 
by abolishing their authority over military operations, 
thus removing any threat to the Army's control of state 
power. 
The prevailing view in Army circles was: ''The 
integration of the Armed Forces will prevent the 
occurrence of situations that arise in Latin America 
where a seizure of power is always accompanied by 
activities on the part of one of the armed forces or of 
individuals within the Armed Forces." (Indonesia 
Magazine, No. 1, 5 December 1969, page 83) Integration 
meant the total subordination of the other three forces, 
the Police, the Air Force and the Navy to the Army High 
Command. The 1969 re-organisation firmly established the 
Army's organi sat ionol ascendancy and supremacy over the 
other three forces. 
While the Police Force has now up to a point been de-
coupled from the Army (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 70, July 
1985), the power relationship established in 1969 has not 
been disturbed by the present re-organisation. 
The Novy (Arni) 
The Navy is being trimmed down in numbers even more 
drastically than the Army. It has been squeezed into two 
commands, losing its territorial character. It has now 
been re-organised into what is essentially an operation-
oriented structure. The two commands are the Eastern 
Fleet (Armada Kawasan Timur or Armotim} and the Western 
Mochtar, the racist 
Fleet (Armada Kawasan Barat or Armobor). Naval personnel 
are to be reduced and the number of flag officers will be 
cut from 70 to 46. The Navy's Chief-of - Staff, Admiral M. 
Ranly says that rigorous procedures will be used to 
select top-ranking officers and between 3,000 and 4,000 
naval officers will be pensioned off. Unlike the Army, he 
asserts, there are no 'generational problems' in the 
Navy; he is the only remaining '1945 -generation' officer 
in the force. 
The two Fleets will operate from five major bases known 
as Lontomal (Pangkolan UtC111a or Prime Bases) located in 
Tanjung Pinang (Riau), Teluk Ratai (Lampung, South 
Sumatra) which is still be to built, Surabaya (East 
Java), Bitung (North Sulawesi) and Ambon (Maluku). The 
relative strengths of the two Fleets is as yet difficult 
to assess. Eastern Fleet operations will cover a vast 
area with numerous islands and seas where foreign vessels 
(surface and submarine) have free passage, with illegal 
Japanese and Taiwanese trawlers operating with impunity. 
It is acknowledged internationally that four of the 
sixteen strategically most important straits in the world 
(in terms of their use for international sea traffic) are 
located within the Indonesian archipelago: the Malacca 
Strait, the Lombok Strait, the Ombai Strait and the Wetar 
Strait. Major disturbances in any of these straits could 
sever the connection between the Pacific Ocean and the 
Asian mainland. According to Admiral Romly, the locations 
for the five Lantamal have been chosen with these 
geographic and strategic considerations in mind. 
The Tanjung Pinang Base will take charge of an 
operational area stretching from the Malacca Strait to 
the Natuna islands, safeguarding the country from 
'threats from the north' from the South China Sea . The 
Continued on page 28 
The following extracts are from an 
interview of Indonesia's Foreign 
Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, by 
Peter Hastings, published in the 
Sydney Horning Heral.d on 16 August: 
The best thing Indonesia has done for 
its Melanesian people in Irion Jayo 
is to get them off "the habit of 
drinking beer", Indonesia's Foreign 
Minister tells me. 
a reference to the Indonesian policy 
of not bringing pressure to bear on 
Port Moresby over the border 
crossers. "A lot hove come bock to 
Irion Jayo, about 2,000 (sic). The 
ones who stay in PNG do so because 
they don't have to work. We don't 
want people who won't work." 
He is relaxed in an armchair in his 
Pejambon office... The Foreign 
Minister is at the top of his 
engaging form. 
.•. He maintains that becou se 
Melanesians have been weaned from 
beer in Irion Joya, "Jayapura is a 
safer place than Port Moresby ••• you 
can't mix primitive people with 
alchohol. It's a recipe for disaster 
everywhere whether it's American 
Indians or Australian Aboriginese, or 
whoever. You bring them into contact 
with alchohol and you destroy them." 
On the subject of the PNG border, 
he says, "I have done well. I hove 
handled the PNG thing right" This is 
•.• But suppose the camps become 
''bases" from which OPM supervisors 
can move across the border into Irion 
Joya, ferment trouble and move back 
into their PNG sanctuary? "The 
problem is for the PNG," he insists. 
''We want lrianese who are able and 
willing to work because we want them 
to become fulltime citizens of 
Indonesia and to pay their way like 
everyone else." 
••• But what were his thoughts on 
the lrianese on Thursday Island who 
had been denied refugee status in 
Australia? ''The biggest problem of 
these lrianese or Papuans or whatever 
you call them is that they hove 
different cultural values. If they 
can manage it, they want to go 
through life doing nothing at all. We 
don't need people like that." 
TAPOL. Bulletin No. 71, Septerri>er 1985 25 
I 
Book review 
Two more books by the Indonesian writer and former political prisoner, Pramoedya Ananta Toer were published in Jakarta on 
2J September. The two book.s are .Jejak Langkah, the third part of his tetralogy, and Sang Pemula (The One Who Began), a 
biography of the first nationalist journalist, Tirto A dhi Soerjo, the man on whom the principal character in the 
tetralogy is based. We are pleased to be able to publish a review of one of the book.s written by Basuk.i Resobowo, a close 
colleague of the author's, who is now living in politicc3.J. exile in Holland. 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Jejak Langkah 
(footsteps), Haste Mitra, Jakarta and 
Manus Amici, Amsterdam, 1985 
Jejak Langkah is the third part of 
the novel Pramoedya wrote while in 
exile on B uru Island. He was in 
detention and exile for 14 years, 
deprived of his freedom and living 
in acute hardship. In order to write, 
he had to steal time from the forced 
physical labour political prisoners 
were required to do every day. He had 
neither writing materiel nor 
do cu mentetion, yet he managed to 
write four books. I em full of 
admiration for his outstanding 
achievement. 
The first two parts of his 
tetralogy have already been 
published, This Earth of Mankind 
(1980) and Child of all Nations 
(1981) Both were greeted 
enthusiastically by the Indonesian 
public and were stunningly 
successful, not only es literary 
works but commercially as well. 
Abroad too, the books were acclaimed. 
The successes of this leftist writer 
who, as a member of Lekra (the 
People's League for Culture), was 
held es a PK! political prisoner, 
shook the confidence of Suharto 
military regime. The two books were 
banned and withdrawn from 
circulation, and copies were burnt by 
the authorities. There were many 
protests abroad, and even in 
Indonesia where dissent is so tightly 
controlled, many people expressed 
their anger at the brutal way the 
authorities treated Pramoedya's 
books. Now we ell wait to see what 
fate will befall his third book. 
The decision to ban Pram's books is 
quite incomprehensible. These novels 
say so much about the history and 
times under colonialism, all of which 
is important for people born after 
Indonesian independence. The present 
generation is incapable of reflecting 
on the growth of the Indc;nesian 
nation and state. Knowledge of 
Indonesia is confined to a schematic 
view of history consisting of a chain 
of events that occurred in the feudal 
era, the colonial era, during the 
Japanese occupation and after 
independence. Pram's books provide a 
different perspective altogether and 
should be compulsory readinq for 
anyone aspiring to become a well-
educated Indonesian. 
Jejak langkah continues the story 
begun in the first two books, of the 
hard life for Indonesians during the 
colonial era when they enjoyed no 
le gal safeguards. There were only 
laws for Europeans and oriental 
foreigners. for native Indonesians 
there was only custom law which 
protected the interests of the 
aristocracy (priy ayi) while ordinary 
people had nothing but the duty to 
serve their superiors. Such was the 
fate of Nyai Ontosoroh, the young 
village girl who was sold to a 
plantation owner, and of Minke who 
was not permitted to marry a girl of 
Dutch origin even though he was of 
'high birth', the son of a 
bupati (feudal district head). 
Jejak langkah tells how in the 
period 1898 to 1918, young Indonesian 
students began to realise through the 
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knowledge they acquired that no hum en 
being can survive without dignity. 
Encouraged by what they had learnt, 
they took the first steps towards 
creating an organisation that would 
struggle for the dignity of 
Indonesian people. I don't want to 
discuss the book ss a work of 
literature; I would rather take a 
look et the story it tells in the 
context of the awakening end struggle 
of modern Indonesians. Whet do I mean 
by a modern Indonesian? I mean 
Pramoedye Anenta Toer, a men who has 
defended his self-respect and 
safeguarded his personal freedom. 
The story is simple end 
straightforward, which is how 
ordinary people think, who see and 
judge everything according to their 
social and economic circumstances - a 
relative not absolutist approach. It 
deals with a period in colonial 
history when people were being molded 
to serve the needs of industrial 
capitalism which had replaced 
mercantilism. Many well-educated 
people were needed, end it w es to 
serve these needs that the 
colonialists formulated their liberal 
ethic el policy, to provide more 
education. The story unfolds in a 
series of scenes, some of them rather 
conventional, that are easy to follow 
for people accustomed to w etching 
wayeng kulit (leather puppet) 
performances. 
Prem starts by introducing the m sin 
liberal-minded colonialists, 
protagonists of the ethical policy 
like Kollewijn, Ter Haar end Marie v. 
Zeggelen. On the other side is the 
Governor-General, van Heutz, 
pretending to be nice to Minke. The 
ethical policy did not liberate 
people. On the contrary, it 
reinforced the colonial grip because 
it taught Indonesians how to behave, 
how to be submissive and obedient to 
their superiors. Minke would not go 
along with the stream, always 
staunchly ind,ependent, standing up 
f~r himself against his superiors 
hke the medical school director who 
expels him for his independent 
spirit. 
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It goes on to tell the story of 
this young Indonesian freeing himself 
from the yoke of traditional ties end 
colonial oppression. An exe m ple of 
his break with tradition is the way 
he chooses the women he marries, 
first a Chinese women, Mei, and later 
a Moluccan woman named Prinses. He 
also mixes freely with colonial 
government of fie i els despite his 
father's misgivings, whose 
traditionalist background teaches him 
otherwise. 
Hinke also becomes involved in 
social, economic and political 
affairs, end we see how he has to 
cope with each of these problems step 
by step (the 'footsteps' in the 
book's title) and through a process 
of political education. Hinke spares 
nothing in terms of his own personal 
wealth, devoting all his time and 
energies to producing publications to 
disseminate information and political 
education to the general public. Then 
there is a clash between his 
ideological upbringing, the religion 
of Islam, end his materiel 
circumstances (between one's place 
end one's identity). 
His portrayal of an emerging 
consciousness is gripping. Improving 
social end economic conditions is not 
achieved just by becoming 
entrepreneurs. It involves a struggle 
for workers' rights and better wages. 
Gradually a conflict unfolds between 
the cam peignin g principles of the 
Sariket Dagang Isla• (Union of 
Islamic Traders) and the principles 
of popular struggle pursued by Hinke. 
Then comes the realisation that the 
struggle to free human beings from 
political oppression and economic 
~xploitation must m een forging 
international links with people in 
the neighbouring countries like 
China, Inda- China, Malaya end the 
Philippines. These are the things 
that create the deep bond between 
Hinke and Mei. 
I cannot end without saying how 
proud I feel, as a member of lekra, 
that my Lekre colleague Prem should 
have become the first Indonesian 
writer to produce a tetrelogy of this 
calibre, a four-part masterpiece. The 
first three are novels and the 
fourth, entitled The Glasshouse, is a 
satire, 
And finally, would like to ask 
Wiretm o Sukitno, the man· who 
initiated the Cultural M anifestol), 
end his like; what have you all got 
to say for yourselves now, after 
enjoying 20 years of protection under 
the Suharto military regime, freed 
from the shackles which you accused 
lekre of placing on your creative 
activity? To this day, I have see 
nothing spectacular produced by any 
of you in literature, painting, 
music, drama, dance or film. The sad 
truth is that the New Order does not 
provide fertile soil for artistic 
creativity. On the contrary, it has 
turned Indonesia into a dumping 
ground for the rubbish produced in 
the USA and western Europe. 
Basuki Resobo 111 o 
l) The Cultural Manifesto ( Hanikebu) 
was a proclamation issued by anti-
Lekre ertiats in 1964. 
Red-beret clique taces charge 
C.I. Sontcso, a counter-insurgency 
expert, now heads transmigration 
bureaucracy 
On 31 July, Major-General Chalimi 
Imam Santosa, one of Indonesia's 
leading generals, was appointed 
Secretary-General of the Department 
of Transmigration. His predecessor 
was also a general, indicating the 
importance the regime ottdches to 
this job. 
C.I Santosa is of the so-called 
'bridging generation', the graduates 
of the P3-AD, the provisional 
military academy set up in Bandung in 
1950. Among his classmates who 
graduated In 1952 ore General Benny 
Murdoni, now Commander of the Armed 
Forces, Major-General Soeweno, n()w 
commander of the Strategic Reserve 
Command, KOSlRAD, Major-General 
Dading Kalbuadi, the 'butcher' of 
East Timar who is now Logistics 
Assistant of the Armed Forces, (Aslog 
AERI), Major-General Soetoryo, now 
Intelligence Assistant of AERI 
(Asintel AERI) and Major-General 
Gunawan Wibisono who until his death 
in June this year was Social and 
Political Assistant of AERI (Assospol 
AERI). This P3-AD clique hos now 
become the most influential group of 
generals within the Indonesian Army 
and AERI as a whole. 
C.I. Santosa together with his 
whole class of 1952 entered the red-
beret parocommando corps which was 
known at the time as the RPKAD, later 
as Kopassandha, and recently renamed 
Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus or 
Special Troops Command). In mid-1965 
he became commander of the RPKAD 
First Battalion, taking over from 
Benny Murdani who had been sent on an 
intelligence assignment, and was 
promoted to the rank of major. 
During the 1 October 1965 events, 
he ployed a vital role in General 
Suharto's military operations to 
assume control of Jakarta by 
commanding the RA<AD unit which 
retook ·the headquarters of the 
Indonesian Radio (~I), assisted by 
Second-Lieutenant Sintong Panjaiton, 
the man recently appointed as 
commander of Kopossus. On, 2 October, 
Major Sontosa was assigned by Suharto 
to td<e over the Halim air-base which 
was under the control of 'rebel' 
troops under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Un tung. 
For the next few months, C.I. 
Sontoso, under the command of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sarwo Edhie, the 
notorious RPKAD chief (now the 
regime's ideological supremo as head 
of the indoctrination board, P7), was 
involved in the army-led operations 
in Central Java which spearheaded the 
massacres in A<l and BTI (peasant 
union) strongholds. Blood-stained by 
these killings, he returned to 
Jakarta early in 1966 to become 
involved in the destabilisation 
operations of RA<AD, using the 
students to disrupt political and 
economic Ii f e in the capital which 
brought about the downfall of 
President Sukarno and the assumption 
of full power by General Suharto. 
C.I. Santosa remained with the 
RPKAD for many years, commanding its 
newly-formed Group IV in 1967. In the 
early 1970s, he spent several years 
abroad, leading the Indonesian 
contingent attached to the UN Peace-
Keeping Force in the Middle East. 
After his return, he took on his 
first territorial assignment as 
Chief-of-Staff of the South 
Kolimantan Mili tory Command, Kodam 
X/Lombung Mangkurat and remained 
there till 1978 when he was appointed 
KodamXVll/Cendrawosihcommander, in 
charge of counter-insurgency in 
turbulent West Papua. 
In 1982, he was appointed to the 
top military 'karyawan' post as 
Karyawan Assistant of AERI (Asker 
ABRI), in charge of military 
appointments in social and political 
affairs, and a year later he became 
head of ABRl'sKaryowanGuidance Body 
(Babinkor) which maintains control 
over all military men assigned to 
'non-military posts'. 
C.I. Santosa's latest appointment 
to one of the most important 
'karyawan' postings is part of a 
number of recent appointments of 
people with a red-beret background, 
all of themmen who md<e up Murdani 's 
inner circle. In the words of 
Indonesia Reports (No. 1 O, August 
1985, page 61 ), 
"Santosa's appointment is a further 
sign of Murdoni's increasing role in 
the transmigration progrome, 
particularly in Irion Joya where 
Santosa ran all counter-insurgency 
operations against the OPM. The 
appointment also signals President 
Suharto's full-speed ahead 
instructions to Martono (Minister of 
Transmigration, TAPOL) on 
transmi gr at ion. Santoso's last 
appointment afforded him intimate 
knowledge of where military officers 
were assigned to civilian positions 
in the government bureaucracy, 
thereby likely facilitating somewhat 
more inter-departmental cooperation 
and coordination in the 
tronsmigrot ion effort." 
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Military profiles 
Sintong Ponjaiton, the new Kopossus 
corrrnander 
Brigadier-General Sintong Ponjoitan, 
the newly-appointed commander of 
Kopassus, the poracommondos corps, 
has already had a long career of 
action and violence. 
Born in Tarutung, North Sumatra on 
4 September 1941, he went to Java in 
1959 after finishing high school and 
became a cadet at the Military 
Academy inMagelang. After graduating 
in 1963, he joined the RPKAD, the 
predecessor of Kopassus, and won a 
reputation as a soldier of 'valour', 
always ready for combat. 
On 1 October 1965, Panjai tan, then 
a second lieutenant, was in the 
detachment assigned to retake the 
radio (~I) building which had been 
occupied by 'rebel' troops under 
Untung's command. Soon afterwards, he 
went to Central Java with RPKAD 
troops on their murderous mission to 
exterminate whole villages of alleged 
communists or sympathisers. His next 
great 'mission of valour' was in East 
Timor whenRA<AD troops were sent on 
numerous missions in an attempt to 
browbeat the population and reinforce 
Indonesia's occupation. 
He become a 'public hero' in 1981 
when, already a lieutenant-colonel, 
he stormed a hijacked Garuda plane at 
Bangkok airport with orders from 
Benny Murden i to capture and kill the 
hijackers. All but one were killed in 
the attack, and the surviving 
hijacker was later killed as well. 
This feat earned him the 'Bintang 
Sakti' (sacred star) and promotion to 
the rank of colonel. 
Prior to his present appointment, 
Sintong Panjaitan was commander of 
Pusanda Linud in Batujajar, 
responsible for training Kopossus 
troops in intelligence work and 
airborne activities. 
His replaces Brigadier-General 
WismoyoArismunandor, formerKopossus 
Sintong Ponjoi ton 
cornnonder, who was suddenly removed 
ofter incurring the displeasure of 
Mrs Tien Suharto, a close relative by 
marriage. Ponjoiton starkly reflects 
the murderous image of Kopossus 
troops. 
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Continued from page 25 
Teluk Ratai Base In South Sumatra will be developed into 
a model naval base and is due to start functioning by the 
end of this century. Its main operational function will 
be protecting the Sunde Straits as the gateway to the 
Indian Ocean. A special team of engineers has been 
recruited to design this base, making it the most 
advanced naval base in the region. 
Teluk Ratai hos been chosen to replace the Surabaya 
Naval Base which is at present the Navy's ma in base. 
Surcboya, one of Indonesia's busiest corrmerciol harbours 
and a centre for heavy sea traffic, is no longer 
considered suitable for naval operations, in particular 
for secret ship movements. Teluk Ratai, a relatively 
isolated and quiet area, offers a far more favourable 
alternative. 
The Bi tung Base in Menado, North Sulawesi is to become 
a 'forward base' protecting the frontiers in times of 
conflict along the line connecting the Malacca Strait, 
the Sulawesi Seo and the Sulu Sea. While no-one mentions 
the country regarded by Indonesian military strategists 
as the likely 'threat', it is not difficult to conclude 
that they have a post-Morcos Philippines in mind. 
Arrbon is the headquarters of the fifth naval base, 
controlling the rich waters of the Moluccas with special 
emphasis on the Banda Seo, richer than any other sea in 
the world for its variety of fish. 
A major 20-year expansion progrorrme has been launched 
to build the Navy along the lines envisaged. New orders 
for naval vessels have already been placed, two mine-
sweepers from Holland, additional Type-209 submarines 
from West Germany and a series of PSK M<.5-class patrol 
boats some of which are on order from South Korea, the 
remainder ore to be built locally at the Surabaya 
shipyard, PT PAL 
The Air Force 
The Air Force hos also been rationalised into two 
operational conTTICJnds, Operational Corrrnand I (Koopsau I) 
based in Jakarta and Operational Corrrnand II (Koopsau II) 
based in Ujung Pandang. Under the new structure, all air 
bases or Lanud (Pangkalan Udora) will assume the same 
responsibilities and will be equipped with the same 
number of jet fighter squadrons. 
According to Air Chief-of-Staff, Air Marshall Sukardi, 
two factors have determined the choice of air-base 
locations - protecting the vital, strategic industrial 
centres and protecting the so-called rawan (security-
prone} regions. The emphasis for the air-bases in the 
Western Koopsau I will be on attack squadrons while the 
Eastern Koopsau II will rely more on patrol squadrons for 
reconnoisance. This indicates that the military 
strategists regard the Asian mainland, primarily Vietnam 
and China, as the danger areas rather than countries on 
the periphery of their eastern waters, the Philippines 
and Australia. 
Pakon Air Base will occupy a vital position situated at 
the crossroads between the Malac.ca Strait and the South 
China Sea. A new forward base called Ranai Air Base is 
being developed on the Natuna islands, with another one 
on Weh Island, the most western tip of the Indonesian 
archipelago. 
The main jet fighter currently being used by the Air 
Force is still the A-4 Sl<yhawk but A~I chiefs are 
anxiously looking for a far more advanced aircraft like 
the F16, the F20 or the Mirage 2000. In the east, the Air 
Force will rely more on the slower Bronco OVJO and the 
Boeing 737-200, equipped with side-looking radar, to keep 
a lookout over the vast seas around Sulawesi, the 
Moluccas and the Lesser $undo Islands. 
Air Force personnel will also be cut in nurrber, with 
special emphasis on the Air Force Special Corrmand which 
was formerly known as Koposgot (Quick Reaction Forces 
Comnand}, now to be called Pasl<hasau (Pasukan Khusus TNl-
AU or Special Air Forcee Troops). 
Centralised control 
Operationally, the Navy and the Air Force will be 
firmly under the control of the Affil comnander, General 
Benny Murdani. The chiefs-of-staff of these two forces 
ore non-vocal, colourless professionals by contrast with 
the Army chief-of-staff, General Rudini, and other senior 
Army corrmonderswho often project o very public image. As 
far as these two forces ore concerned, the emphasis is on 
the purchase of modern equipment and advanced technology. 
In the words of one novaJ officer, whereas in the Army, 
the focus is on manpower and the weapons needed to arm 
them (orang yang dipersenjatai), for the Novy and the Air 
Force, it is the hardware and weapons systems that count 
and the personnel needed to man them (senjato yang 
diawaki). Both forces will inevitably become 
technologically top-heavy. 
Some non-military Affil-watchers hove expressed doubts 
about the ability of these two forces to cope with the 
advanced systems now under consideration for their use. 
The maintenance, operational and coordination 
requirements for these 'new toys' are formidable but if 
the Affil leadership have their way and western arms 
exporters succeed in winning the orders they want, this 
is where much of Indonesia's diminishing stock of foreign 
currency will be spent. 
Next issue: Part VI. Purchasing weapons for A BRI. 
* Part I appeared in Bulletin 69. Part II appeared in 
Bulletin 7 o. 
Stop Press 
A fire almost completely gutted the studios of the 
Nu son taro 111 network of Radio Republic Indonesia ~I) 
in Banjarmasin, the capitol of South Kolimonton, on 27 
Septerrber. This follows a huge fire which completely 
destroyed ~l's central studios in Jakarta two months 
ago, on 20 July. (See TAPOL Bulletin No 70, .lily 1985) 
Despite calls from various circles including people in 
the Army's political party, GOLKAR, the government hos 
offered no expJanation for the causes of the Jakarta ~I 
fire. The latest incident reinforces the impression that 
disside1nt groups may be directing their efforts at one of 
the regime's most powerful means of propaganda. 
Subscriptions 
Annual rates 
(six issues) 
lndiv id uals 
Institutions 
UK,£urope and 
overseas/surface 
£ 7.50 
£12.00 
Overseas/ 
airmail 
£10.00 
£14.00 
Overseas subscribers please add £1.50 on cheques not 
drawn on a London bank, to cover bank charges. 
Rates for Australian subscribers: 
Individual 
Institutions 
Ses•ail 
A $14.00 
A $22.00 
Airmail 
A $19.00 
A $26.00 
Australian subscribers may pay, at these rates, to: 
Eleanor Tan 
11 Lyric Grove, 
Camberwell, Victoria 3124 
TAP 0 L's Giro account no: 56 781 4009 
Subscriptions and correspondence to: 
TA POL 
Ba Treport Street, 
London SW18 2BP 
(01) 874 3262 
28 TAPOL Bulletin No. 71, September 1985 
